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This Article explores the efficient design of civil liability for mandatory securi-
ties disclosure violations by established issuers.  An issuer not publicly offer-
ing securities at the time of a violation should have no liability.  Its annual
filings should be signed by an external certifier—an investment bank or
other well-capitalized entity with financial expertise.  If the filing contains a
material misstatement and the certifier fails to do due diligence, the certifier
should face measured liability.  Officers and directors should face similar
liability, capped relative to their compensation but with no indemnification
or insurance allowed. Damages should be payable to the issuer, not traders in
its shares, because the true social harm from issuer misstatements is poor
corporate governance and reduced liquidity.  A trader is as likely to be a
gainer by selling, as a loser by buying, at the misstatement-inflated price.
An issuer publicly offering securities at the time of a violation should be
liable to purchasers for the resulting inflation in price.  Such liability is an
antidote to what otherwise would be an extra incentive not to comply.
This design would increase incentives for U.S. issuers to comply with
periodic disclosure rules.  At the same time, litigation-expensive fraud-on-the-
market class actions would be eliminated.  So would underwriter liability for
lack of due diligence, a sharply diminishing spur for disclosure given the
speed of modern offerings.  For countries considering implementation of se-
curities disclosure civil liability systems for the first time, this design helps
them get it right from the start.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate transparency has been increasingly recognized as a key
element in financial market development and in economic growth more
generally.  Mandatory disclosure regimes seek to promote corporate
transparency by requiring issuers to disclose information about them-
selves that they might otherwise not be inclined to release.  A system that
permits civil damages actions against persons associated with a mandatory
disclosure violation can create incentives to encourage compliance.  This
Article addresses the optimal design of such a system of civil damages in
the case of established issuers trading in major securities markets.  This
“start from scratch” inquiry is timely both in the United States and
abroad.  In the United States, civil liability is an established tool to en-
courage compliance, but the existing system has come under intense
strain.  Abroad, interest in civil liability is just awakening, and countries
have the opportunity to write on a clean slate.
This Article seeks to answer five questions:  Who should be civilly
liable for damages when a disclosure violation occurs?  According to what
standard?  For how much?  To whom?  And should it matter whether the
issuer is selling securities at the time of the violation?  A central thesis of
this Article is that the answers to these questions should reflect the more
modern understanding that the primary way that mandatory disclosure
increases social welfare is by enhancing economic efficiency through bet-
ter corporate governance and increased liquidity, not by providing inves-
tor protection.  Approaching the design of the liability system from this
perspective suggests a new set of insights into many of the traditional lia-
bility issues.
Part I establishes the need for a fundamental reevaluation of how to
design a system of civil damages for mandatory disclosure violations.
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Parts II and III develop the argument that a mandatory disclosure regime
should require a similar level of disclosure whether or not an issuer is
offering securities.  Accordingly, any accompanying system of civil liability
should be designed to provide the relevant actors with equally strong in-
centives to comply under either circumstance.  Part II analyzes the path-
ways through which increased disclosure improves corporate governance
and enhances liquidity.  This analysis shows that the social interest in the
disclosures of established issuers trading in major markets is equally great
whether or not the issuer is making a new securities offering.  Part III
demonstrates the affirmative harm that results from imposing greater ex-
pected liability for mandatory disclosure violations on the relevant actors
(other than the issuer) when an issuer is making a public offering than
when it is not.  This harm arises because of the resulting inefficient distor-
tion in the issuer management’s choice of sources of finance.
Part IV sets out my proposed optimal civil liability system.  The pro-
posal is constructed under the assumption that a country has decided it is
socially desirable to have a mandatory disclosure regime with a system of
civil liability to encourage compliance.  Under my proposal, there would
be no issuer liability for misstatements in periodic filings when the issuer
is not offering securities.  This means that in the United States, fraud-on-
the-market suits for such violations would be eliminated.  There would
also be no underwriter liability for issuer misstatements at the time of a
securities offering.  In place of these two types of actions, issuers would be
required to have their annual periodic filings certified by an investment
bank or other well-capitalized entity with substantial financial expertise
that would be subject to measured liability if the certifying entity failed in
its due diligence.  Officers and directors would be subject to a similar
liability scheme.  There would be issuer liability for disclosure violations
when the issuer publicly offers its securities, as an antidote to the extra
motives to defy mandatory disclosure regulations at such a time.
Part V considers the proposed system in the context of other recent
scholarly discussion on the subject.  Part VI considers how the proposed
scheme could be implemented in the United States.
I. THE NEED FOR A FUNDAMENTAL REEVALUATION OF CIVIL
LIABILITY DESIGN
The moment is ripe for a fundamental reevaluation of how to design
a system of civil liability for mandatory securities disclosure violations.  In
the United States, the existing system’s increasing strain has led to a vari-
ety of calls for reform.  Parochial interests spur many of the proponents
and opponents of these reforms, as would be expected in a pluralistic
democracy.  Resolving their contending claims requires a conceptual
framework that reflects the realities of contemporary markets and a mod-
ern understanding of corporate governance and financial economics.
Countries abroad considering initiating civil liability systems for the first
time need such a framework at least as much, given the value of getting
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the system’s design correct from the start.  For these countries, the ex-
isting U.S. system, given its problems, is no longer an obvious model to
imitate.
A. The United States
The civil liability system in the United States was initially designed in
the early 1930s with the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 (the
“Securities Act”)1 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
“Exchange Act”).2  Much has changed over the last seventy-five years.
Capital markets have become much more liquid and better informed,
developments that in turn have led to fundamental changes in corporate
governance.3  Understanding of financial economics has advanced enor-
mously:  A field that was once an intellectual backwater is now a fertile
source for Nobel prizes.4  The primary focus of the underlying disclosure
regime for established issuers has shifted from new securities offerings to
ongoing periodic reporting, largely as a result of Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) rulemaking.
In response to these changes, Congress, the SEC, and the courts
have made piecemeal adaptations to the 1930s-designed civil liability sys-
tem.  What we have today, however, falls far short of the civil liability sys-
tem that a modern understanding suggests would most effectively and
efficiently support our current system of mandatory disclosure.
1. The Traditional Approach. — Traditionally, the U.S. mandatory dis-
closure regime focused primarily on an issuer’s disclosure at the time it
was making a public offering of securities.  Under the Securities Act, the
offering was required to be registered, which involved filing a statement
with the SEC that answered a variety of disclosure-prompting questions.
Persons associated with the offering faced a comprehensive system of civil
damage liability.  Absolute liability was imposed on the issuer for inves-
tors’ damages arising from a material misstatement in the registration
statement.5  Absolute liability subject to a “due diligence” defense was im-
1. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa
(2006)).
2. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78lll).
3. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950–2005:  Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465, 1469–71
(2007) (attributing development of modern U.S. corporations’ orientation toward share
value maximization and prevalence of independent director-dominated monitoring boards
to increase in informedness of share prices and liquidity of capital markets).
4. Winners whose work was primarily in financial economics include George Stigler
(1982), Franco Modigliani (1985), Harry Markowitz (1990), Merton Miller (1990), William
Sharpe (1990), Robert Merton (1997), and Myron Scholes (1997).  See All Laureates in
Economics, at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/ (last visited Jan.
14, 2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
5. Section 11(a) of the Securities Act provides that any person acquiring a security
whose registration statement contains “an untrue statement of a material fact or omit[s] to
state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading” may bring an action for damages against, among others, the
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posed on the issuer’s top officers and directors and on the investment
banks underwriting the offering.6  This imposition of absolute liability
subject to a due diligence defense was intended to motivate each of the
nonissuer actors, particularly the lead underwriter, to do an independent
investigation of the issuer and to participate actively in the drafting of the
registration statement.7
In contrast, although issuers with publicly traded shares were re-
quired on an ongoing basis to make periodic disclosures on Forms 10-K,
10-Q, and 8-K filed pursuant to the Exchange Act, misstatements in these
filings traditionally did not give rise to any effective kind of civil liability in
most situations.8
directors and top officers of the issuer, the offering’s underwriters, and every other person
who signs the registration statement, which includes the issuer.  15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
6. Section 11(a), as just noted, imposes absolute liability on each of these actors.  See
id.  Section 11(b) frees each of these actors (but not the issuer) from this liability if the
actor can affirmatively establish that “he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable
ground to believe and did believe” that the registration did not contain the untrue
statement or omission triggering the section 11(a) claim.  Id. § 77k(b)(3)(A).
7. See Edward F. Greene, Determining the Responsibilities of Underwriters
Distributing Securities Within an Integrated Disclosure System, 56 Notre Dame L. Rev.
755, 767–70 (1981) (noting that full disclosure was key goal in drafting of section 11 of
Securities Act); see also Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 581
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) (“‘Only the underwriter and the accountant are free to assume an adverse
role, have little incentive to accept the risk of liability, and possess the facilities and
competence to undertake an independent investigation.  They may therefore reasonably
be required to share the burden of verification.’” (quoting Comment, BarChris:  Due
Diligence Redefined, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1411, 1421 (1968))); Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696–97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (discussing responsibility of underwriters
to protect investors by verifying information).  Commentary by persons intimately involved
with the creation of the Securities Act confirm that this in terrorem arrangement for
imposing damages in the absence of adequate investigation was a critical part of the
legislative plan to promote full disclosure.  See William O. Douglas & George Bates, The
Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L.J. 171, 173 (1933) (asserting that civil liabilities
were “set high to guarantee that the risk of their invocation will be effective in assuring that
the ‘truth about securities’ will be told”); Felix Frankfurter, The Securities Act:  II, Fortune,
Aug. 1933, at 53, 108 (“The scope of the liability is carefully defined.  Untruth in a material
fact or its omission—the means whereby investors are misled—makes all who are
chargeable with the duty of knowing and revealing the truth liable to an investor in
ignorance of the truth.”).
8. As a formal matter, a material misstatement in any of these Exchange Act periodic
filings is subject to liability pursuant to section 18(a) of the Exchange Act.  15 U.S.C. § 78r.
Court decisions, however, have concluded that to succeed, the plaintiff must establish
“eyeball reliance” on the misstatement in the filed document.  See, e.g., Ross v. A.H.
Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 552–53 (2d Cir. 1979) (“‘Reliance on the actual [filed] report is
an essential prerequisite for a Section 18 action and constructive reliance is not
sufficient.’” (quoting Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1968))). This
requirement cuts out most investors since the typical investor, when making a buy or sell
decision, does not read the issuer’s actual Exchange Act filings.  At most, she would find
out about a misstatement in such a filing only indirectly, by learning information based on
the misstatement contained in an online, newspaper, or analyst report.  Also, because the
eyeball reliance requirement involves particularized proof with regard to each claimant,
class actions are not practical.  Without the availability of a class action, most securities
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2. Modern Developments. — Two developments over the last twenty-
five years have radically altered this picture.  Both are related to the in-
creasing acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) from fi-
nancial economics, which holds that the prices of securities of large, es-
tablished issuers trading in liquid markets fully reflect all publicly
available information.9  One development is the underlying mandatory
disclosure regime’s movement toward a “company registration” ap-
proach.  The other is the rise of the fraud-on-the-market class action.
These two developments create multiple strains that undermine both the
policy rationale for the existing system of civil liability and its political
support.
a. The Movement Toward Company Registration and the Question of Under-
writer Liability. — Under the company registration approach, a large, es-
tablished, publicly traded issuer would register just once, provide infor-
mation thereafter on a periodic basis, and then be able to offer and sell
securities whenever it wished without the need to register the securities
themselves.10  The U.S. movement toward company registration, though
still not complete, has switched the regime’s primary regulatory focus for
these issuers to their ongoing periodic disclosures.11  Such issuers, as a
claims are not worth the costs of pursuing.  As a result of these factors, section 18(a) has
largely been considered a “dead letter.”  David L. Ratner & Thomas Lee Hazen, Securities
Regulation:  Cases and Materials 328–31 (5th ed. 1996).  Liability for such a misstatement
was also not available based on Exchange Act section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008), at least as a practical matter, until the issuance of court
decisions, discussed infra note 16, broadening the interpretation of the Rule’s “in R
connection with the purchase or sale of a security” requirement and facilitating class
actions by allowing a presumption of reliance based on the fraud-on-the-market theory.
9. See Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers & Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate
Finance 358–59 (9th ed. 2008) (summarizing EMH).
10. The core logic of company registration is that established issuers are already
required on a continuing basis to answer most of the questions that they have traditionally
been asked to answer when registering new offerings and that no useful purpose is served
in requiring the questions to be answered again at the time of each securities offering.
According to the efficient market hypothesis, for an established issuer whose shares trade
in a thick, efficient market, its answers to these questions in its periodic filings will already
be reflected in the prevailing secondary market price at the time of the new primary
offering.  The price of the shares in the new offering will be determined primarily by this
secondary market price.  The origins of the company registration concept can be traced to
a 1966 article by Milton Cohen.  Milton H. Cohen, “Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 Harv.
L. Rev. 1340, 1341–42 (1966).  It subsequently formed the organizing principle behind the
American Law Institute’s proposed codification of federal securities law.  See Fed. Sec.
Code, at xx–xxi (1980) (citing Cohen, supra, as an impetus for codification project).
Congress never enacted the wholesale reform of the securities acts envisioned in the ALI
Code, but the ideas in the code and in Cohen’s article have animated much SEC
rulemaking over the last few decades.  See infra note 11. R
11. This shift began in the 1970s with the SEC’s adoption of Regulation S-K, which
served as the basis for coordinating disclosure under both the Securities Act registration
requirements for new offerings and the Exchange Act periodic disclosure requirements by
having the requirements for each incorporate by reference questions set out in a single
regulation.  See 17 C.F.R. § 229.  This development was followed in the early 1980s by the
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adoption of Rule 415 “shelf registration,” id. § 230.415, and S-3 “short form” registration,
id. § 239.13.  Rule 415 permits, for large established issuers, a single registration statement
to register a set number of securities that could be offered from time to time over a two-
year period and that would incorporate subsequent periodic disclosure filings by reference
as amendments to the original “shelf” registration statement.  Shelf Registration, Securities
Act Release No. 6499, Exchange Act Release No. 20,384, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,889, 52,894–95
(Nov. 23, 1983).  Rule 415 was a departure from the traditional position of the SEC not to
permit an issuer to register securities that it does not intend to sell immediately.  The
traditional position was based on an interpretation of the language of section 6(a) of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a), and reflected a policy against the sale of securities on the
basis of stale information.  See In re Shawnee Chiles Syndicate, 10 S.E.C. 109, 113 (1941)
(describing section 6(a) policy to “assure investors that the registration statements . . . on
which they rely, so far as is reasonably possible, provide current information”).
The S-3 short form registration procedure takes advantage of the fact that under the
periodic reporting requirements of the Exchange Act, a registered issuer must annually file
a Form 10-K, which covers a wide range of questions about the issuer’s business, finances,
and management, a quarterly report on Form 10-Q, and, when certain “extraordinary
events” happen, a “current report” on Form 8-K.  See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure
System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, Exchange Act Release No. 18,524, Investment
Company Act Release No. 12,264, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,382–85 (Mar. 16, 1982)
(announcing adoption of Form S-3).  Form S-3 allows a large, established, thickly traded
issuer to incorporate by reference into its registration statement the information provided
in its 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K filings over the preceding year.  The only information relating to
the affairs of the issuer that must actually be set out in the registration statement is, in most
cases, the use of proceeds and a description of any material change since the last 10-K not
already described in a subsequent 10-Q or 8-K.  Id.
In the first half of the 1990s, the SEC took steps that further reduced the central role
that the registration statement and prospectus traditionally played in regulating the
offering process, loosening the rules on prefiling publicity and pre-effectiveness written
promotions.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure:  The Coming
Debate over Company Registration, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1143, 1150–55 (1995)
[hereinafter Coffee, Re-Engineering] (describing SEC changes during this period).  In
1996, the SEC’s Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Process
(the “Advisory Committee”), chaired by then Commissioner Steven Wallman, issued a
report exploring what a full-fledged company registration system would look like and
recommending a voluntary pilot program.  See Report of the Advisory Committee on the
Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes, [1996–1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,834, at 88,403 (July 24, 1996), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/capform.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Wallman
Report].  The SEC’s initial response, in November 1998, was the release of its “Aircraft
Carrier” proposal, so named because of its sheer physical size.  See The Regulation of
Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7606A, Exchange Act Release No. 40,632A,
Investment Company Act Release No. 23,519A, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174, 67,174 (proposed Nov.
3, 1998) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.) (announcing proposed SEC
revisions).
Although criticisms of the “Aircraft Carrier” proposal led to its abandonment by the
SEC, a modified version, generally referred to as the “offering reforms,” was adopted in
late 2005, by means of a number of new or amended rules.  See Securities Offering
Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act Release No. 52,056, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005) (codified in
scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.) (announcing securities offering reforms).  While not fully
abandoning the traditional transactional basis of disclosure regulation, the reforms took
the regulatory regime, particularly for large, established, publicly traded issuers, yet further
in the direction of company registration by their even greater emphasis on Exchange Act
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practical matter, can offer their shares at any time they wish, without de-
lay or significant additional disclosure beyond their most recent periodic
filings.  Registration of the offering is still required as a formal matter,
however, which has important implications for liability.
The Securities Act system of liability for misstatements at the time
of an offering of new securities, while still fully workable for a new
issuer doing an initial public offering (IPO), does not fit well with this
movement toward company registration for large, established issuers that
are already publicly traded.  The speed with which new securities issues
can be brought to market by such issuers makes it impossible for the un-
derwriter, as a practical matter, to do due diligence and thus to play its
traditional gatekeeper role in assuring that what is disclosed about
the issuer at the time of offering fully and truthfully meets the regula-
tions.12  Yet these offerings still need to be registered and, as the recent
In re Worldcom, Inc. Securities Litigation decision makes clear, the standard
of liability imposed on the underwriter has not significantly changed.13
Thus underwriters have moved from being a force to promote disclosure
to being merely an insurer for disclosure failure.14  Underwriters
periodic disclosure.  The starting point is amended Rule 405, which provides a definition
for “Well-Known Seasoned Issuers” (“WKSIs”), a category intended to cover large,
established, publicly traded corporations expected to be thickly traded and followed by
analysts in the market.  17 C.F.R. § 230.405; Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. at
44,726–27 (describing WKSIs).  WKSIs are permitted under the amended Rule 415 to
register “for the shelf” an unlimited number of shares to be offered (subject to refiling
requirement every three years) at any point in the future, from time to time, or on a
continuous basis.  17 C.F.R. § 230.405.  Under this “automatic shelf registration”
procedure, payment of registration fees is allowed on a “pay as you go” basis, rather than at
the time of registration, as was required previously.  Id. § 230.456.  Immediate “takedowns”
of securities so registered can occur without any delay for possible SEC review of updating
filings.  Id. § 230.415(a)(5).  Because of a change in Rule 415(a)(4), shares registered
pursuant to the automatic shelf registration procedure may also be used for “at the market
offerings” made directly into the secondary market, either by the issuer itself or with the
aid of a broker.  Unlike before, there is no need to name an underwriter in the registration
statement and no limit on the number of shares so offered.  1 Louis Loss, Joel Seligman &
Troy Paredes, Securities Regulation 550 (4th ed. 2006).
12. In theory, since the underwriter continues to face section 11 liability, it could
insist that the offering be held up pending completion of a proper due diligence
investigation.  Delays, however, are costly for issuers.  This cost was not present before the
short form and shelf registration reforms made speedy registration possible.  For a fuller
discussion of the reasons why short form and shelf registration led investment banks to
stop performing their traditional due diligence role, see Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration,
Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence:  An Economic Analysis, 70 Va. L.
Rev. 1005, 1025–30 (1984) [hereinafter Fox, Shelf Registration].
13. See In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 662–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(noting requirement that underwriter’s behavior be “reasonable”).
14. In Professor Coffee’s view, underwriters could simply regard the risk of liability
from not doing due diligence as a necessary cost of doing business in order to compete
and provide the issuer with quick access to the market.  They could raise their fees or
increase insurance coverage to compensate for this risk.  John C. Coffee, Due Diligence
After WorldCom, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 2005, at 5.
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argue that this role serves little social purpose and should be
eliminated.15
b. Class Action Damage Suits. — Two judicial developments—the
broadened interpretation of when an issuer misstatement can be consid-
ered “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security” under Rule
10b-5 and the creation of the presumption of reliance under the fraud-
on-the-market theory—made practical class action law suits based on ma-
terial misstatements in an issuer’s Exchange Act periodic disclosure fil-
ings.  Prior to the late 1980s, an issuer that had made such a statement,
even with scienter, faced little or no threat of civil damage liability.16
15. See Circumstances Affecting the Determination of What Constitutes Reasonable
Investigation and Reasonable Grounds for Belief Under Section 11 of the Securities Act,
Securities Act Release No. 6335, Exchange Act Release No. 18,011, Investment Company
Act Release No. 11,889, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,015, 42,017 (proposed Aug. 18, 1981) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230) (“[T]his reduction in preparation time, together with
competitive pressures, will restrict the ability of responsible underwriters to conduct what
would be deemed to be a reasonable investigation . . . . [I]ssuers may be reluctant to wait
for responsible underwriters to finish their inquiry . . . .”); see also Comm’n on Fed.
Regulation of Sec., Report of Task Force on Sellers’ Due Diligence and Similar Defenses
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 48 Bus. Law. 1185, 1239 (1993) (“The ‘integrated
disclosure system’ and the expansion of shelf registration statements have called into
question whether underwriters any longer ‘sponsor’ an issue in a meaningful way, as
opposed to delivering advice and distribution services.”); Letter from ABA Comm’n on
Fed. Regulation of Sec., Bus. Law Section, to David B.H. Martin, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin.,
SEC (Aug. 22, 2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL410000
pub/comments/20010822010000.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[T]he
benefits of ‘on demand financing’ . . . are undermined by continuing to impose on
financial intermediaries and other ‘gatekeepers’ the responsibility . . . to do a sufficient
due diligence investigation . . . without recognizing and making allowances for their
difficulty or even inability to do so.”); Letter from The Bond Mkt. Ass’n to Jonathan G.
Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 31, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (urging relaxation
of underwriter liability on shelf registration); Letter from Davis Polk & Wardwell to
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 31, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (same);
Letter from Merrill Lynch to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 31, 2005) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (same); Letter from Sec. Indus. Ass’n to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC
(Jan. 31, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (same); Letter from Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 31, 2005) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (same).
16. The starting point for the development of fraud-on-the-market class actions
against an issuer for damages suffered as a result of an issuer misstatement goes back forty
years.  In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the court found that whenever an issuer makes a
statement that is “reasonably calculated to influence the investing public,” such statement
satisfies Rule 10b-5’s requirement that it be “in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security,” even if neither the issuer nor its managers buy or sell shares themselves.  401 F.2d
833, 860–62 (2d Cir. 1968).  This potential liability did not become a serious threat to most
issuers, however, until class actions became possible with the development of the fraud-on-
the-market theory of reliance, which was first enunciated in the lower courts in the 1970s
and was affirmed by the Supreme Court only in 1988.  See Basic Inc. v Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 247 (1988).  A material public misstatement by an official of an issuer whose shares
trade in an efficient market will, under the efficient market hypothesis, affect the issuer’s
share price.  This effect provides a plaintiff a way to establish “the requisite causal
connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s injury.”  Id. at 243.
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Thereafter such an issuer began to be subject to potentially enormous
liability based on the losses of all the investors who purchased shares dur-
ing the period that the misstatement inflated the price and who still held
them when the market became aware of the truth.17  The rise of the
fraud-on-the-market class action thus created strong new incentives for an
issuer to comply with its periodic disclosure obligations.  Considered in
isolation, these new incentives were a good development, given the shift
in focus of the underlying regulatory regime to periodic disclosure.
There is a widespread feeling, however, that the incentives come at great
social expense.18  As the scandals of the early 2000s and the huge number
of recent accounting restatements suggest, they are also far from totally
This is an alternative to establishing this connection through a showing of traditional
reliance, which involves demonstrating that the misstatement induced the plaintiff to
purchase or sell the security.  In the case of a falsely positive statement, for example,
allowing the plaintiff to show reliance by establishing that the defendant’s misstatement
caused the plaintiff to pay too much, rather than that it caused the defendant to enter into
what turned out to be an unfavorable transaction, eliminates the need to make
particularized claims of reliance for each purchaser.  Thus, common issues of fact
predominate and class actions become possible.  Prior to the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance that made class actions practical, the individual investor rarely
found the prospective recovery of just her own damages sufficient to justify the cost of
bringing suit.
17. See Todd Foster et al., NERA Econ. Consulting, Recent Trends in Shareholder
Class Action Litigation:  Filings Stay Low and Average Settlements Stay High—But Are
These Trends Reversing?  1 (2007), available at http://www.nera.com/image/PUB_
RecentTrends_Sep2007-FINAL.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting average
settlement values were at all-time high in first half of 2007, and “[f]or the first time, all of
the top ten shareholder class action settlements exceed $1 billion”); see also infra note 18 R
(discussing large amounts that issuers paid out annually in connection with such suits in
prior years).
18. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Class Action, 106 Colum. L. Rev.
1534, 1562–63 (2006) [hereinafter Coffee, Reforming] (describing argument that fraud-
on-the-market class actions may shift costs to shareholders, who may themselves be victims
of securities fraud).  For the years 2000 through 2005, total annual securities class action
settlements have averaged about $4.1 billion.  See Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan,
Cornerstone Research, Post-Reform Act Securities Settlements:  2005 Review and Analysis 1
fig.1 (2006), available at http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/settlements_2005.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reaching $4.1 billion figure by averaging total
settlement dollars each year from 2000 to 2005).  Studies suggest that contingent fee
awards to plaintiffs’ lawyers in securities class actions average around thirty percent.  See
Frederick C. Dunbar & Vinita M. Juneja, Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs., Recent Trends II:
What Explains Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions?  tbl.4 (1993) (finding that
attorneys’ fees averaged 31.32% of settlements in sample of 135 cases from July 1991
through June 1993); Frederick C. Dunbar et al., Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs., Recent
Trends III:  What Explains Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions? ii (1995) (finding
that although average settlements fell between 1993 and 1994, plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees
remained constant, averaging one-third of settlement awards, or $1.96 million in 1993 and
$2.03 million in 1994).  If we assume that defendants’ lawyers are paid comparable fees,
this would suggest that the total annual legal expenses associated with these actions
averaged about $2.46 billion ((.30 + .30) x $4.1 billion).  The plaintiffs’ expenses come out
of the judgment or settlement and hence diminish what would otherwise be paid to the
investors who claim to be injured.  The issuer defendants’ expenses are ultimately borne by
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effective.19  Such shortcomings have led some to call for eliminating, or
substantially curtailing, fraud-on-the-market class actions.20  These calls
have gained momentum as prominent persons have expressed concern
about the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets versus those abroad
and have suggested that securities class actions are part of the problem.21
I will argue in Part IV that both underwriter liability at the time of
new offerings and fraud-on-the-market actions based on periodic disclo-
sure violations should indeed be eliminated, but only as part of a funda-
their shareholders at the time suit is brought.  Other social costs include use of the judicial
system and the time and attention the issuers’ executives devoted to the litigation.
19. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeepers:  The Role of the Professions and Corporate
Governance 15 (2006) [hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeepers] (describing rash of financial
scandals, including those involving Enron and Worldcom, whereby issuers attempted to
maximize market price of their securities by creating misimpressions as to what their future
cash flows were likely to be, and hundreds of resulting restatements).
20. See Anjan V. Thakor with Jeffrey S. Nielsen & David A. Gulley, U.S. Chamber Inst.
for Legal Reform, The Economic Reality of Securities Class Action Litigation 4–6 (2005),
available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.org/issues/docload.cfm?docID=855 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (concluding that class action securities litigation often
overcompensates institutional investors); Anjan V. Thakor, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal
Reform, The Unintended Consequences of Securities Litigation 14 (2005), available at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.org/issues/docload.cfm?docID=857 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Thakor, Unintended Consequences] (arguing that
litigation destroys shareholder wealth, creates deadweight loss, and lowers firms’ capital
investment); see also Coffee, Reforming, supra note 18, at 1585–86 (concluding that R
securities class action does not benefit shareholders and should be reconfigured into
“mechanism for deterrence”); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market
Securities Fraud, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 639, 646–47 (1996) (finding that “direct net harm” of
fraud may be zero and that litigation overcompensates investors); Amanda M. Rose,
Reforming Securities Litigation Reform:  Restructuring the Relationship Between Public
and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1304–05 (2008) (arguing
that litigation can lead to overcompensation and stymie governmental efforts to set
effective enforcement policy).
21. The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, also known as the “Paulson
Committee,” claims, for example, that there has been a reduction in the competitiveness of
U.S. capital markets versus markets abroad due in part to the costs imposed on issuers by
fraud-on-the-market class actions and the uncertainty that they create.  The Committee
calls for reforms that would effectively reduce or eliminate such actions.  For example, it
calls upon the SEC to impose a stricter standard than most courts have adopted
concerning what must be shown to demonstrate that the market for a security is sufficiently
efficient to justify application of the fraud-on-the-market theory.  See Interim Report of the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation 81–82 (2006), available at http://www.
capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (calling for adoption of In re PolyMedica Corp. Securities Litigation,
432 F.3d 1, 26 (1st Cir. 2005), rule that plaintiffs must prove market price fully reflects all
publicly available information).  More importantly, the Committee calls for the SEC to
permit managers, with the approval of shareholders, to adopt charter amendments barring
shareholders from bringing fraud-on-the-market damage actions to court.  Such claims
would instead be heard in arbitration.  If the charter amendment so provided, the claims
could be brought only individually by each shareholder, not by a class action.  Id. at
109–11.  As noted supra note 16, this would largely eliminate issuer liability altogether R
since, for most investors, individual actions do not have the prospect of sufficiently large
recovery to merit the costs of bringing the action.
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mentally redesigned system of civil liability that creates in their place new,
more efficient and effective incentives for periodic disclosure
compliance.22
B. Other Countries
Abroad, civil liability is not an established tool to encourage
mandatory disclosure compliance.  With the increasing concern for cor-
porate transparency, however, interest is growing.  The starting point for
this increasing concern with transparency is the growing recognition of
the value of deep, vibrant equity markets and of the dispersed pattern of
corporate ownership that they permit.23  By making it easier for issuers to
raise funds and investors to invest, such markets and ownership structures
facilitate the transfer of funds from stable or declining firms, with sub-
stantial cash flows but few promising new investment projects, to growing,
often new, firms, with less cash flow but many promising investment
projects.  By making diversification easier, dispersed ownership promotes
the more efficient allocation of risk.  The liquidity that deep, vibrant mar-
kets provide both lowers the cost of capital for issuers and increases inves-
tor utility.24  By giving venture capitalists an option to exit start-ups
through the sale of their interests in an IPO, such markets promote inno-
vation.25  Share prices in such markets also more efficiently impound in-
formation held by diverse persons that is relevant to predicting an issuer’s
future cash flows and in so doing help managers make decisions based on
more accurate cash flow projections.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781, 832–38 (2001) [hereinafter Black, Legal and
Institutional Preconditions] (discussing qualitative advantages of strong securities markets
and collecting studies showing relationship between strong securities markets and
economic growth); Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth:  Views and
Agenda, 35 J. Econ. Lit. 688, 703–20 (1997) (compiling evidence indicating “strong,
positive link between financial development and economic growth”).  For empirical
evidence that the direction of causation leads from financial development generally (both
in the form of a banking sector and of stock markets) to economic growth and not the
other way around, see Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and
Growth, 88 Am. Econ. Rev. 559, 584 (1998).  For further discussion of the advantages of
dispersed ownership, see Erik Berglo¨f & Stijn Claessens, Enforcement and Corporate
Governance 3 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3409, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=625286 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that
consolidated ownership leads to “entrenchment of the manager and owner, poor
performance of firms, limited risk diversification, liquidity costs as the owner cannot sell its
stake easily, and minority rights expropriation”).
24. See infra Part II.D (arguing that greater disclosure increases liquidity and reduces
cost of capital, leading to more efficient allocation of scarce resources).
25. See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of
Capital Markets:  Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. Fin. Econ. 243, 257–64 (1998)
(showing that venture capitalists’ successful exits take place disproportionately through
IPOs).
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Vibrant, deep equity markets and dispersed ownership structures in
turn appear to be possible only with a high level of corporate trans-
parency.26  Transparency has also been heralded as necessary for good
corporate governance more generally.27
Several countries have implemented, or are considering implement-
ing, laws that would promote civil liability for disclosure violations.  In
Canada, where securities regulation is primarily a provincial responsibil-
ity, Ontario, the leading financial province, recently enacted new legisla-
tion making it easier for investors to sue in the event of issuer misstate-
ments.28  Korea has provided for securities class actions for the first
time.29  Sweden, France, Spain, Germany, Norway, and the Netherlands
have each adopted reforms that remove some of the traditional road-
blocks to U.S. style class actions.30  The governments in Ireland and
26. See Coffee, Gatekeepers, supra note 19, at 109 (describing impossibility of R
dispersed ownership and separation of ownership from control without reliable, audited
financial statements); Erik Berglo¨f & A. Pajuste, Emerging Owners, Eclipsing Markets:
Corporate Governance in Central and Eastern Europe, in Corporate Governance and
Capital Flows in a Global Economy 267, 267–68 (Peter K. Cornelius & Bruce Kogut eds.,
2003) (explaining how countries with poor transparency were quickly transformed, after
initial privatization auctions created dispersed ownership, to concentrated ownership
economies); Black, Legal and Institutional Preconditions, supra note 23, at 783, 834–35 R
(collecting empirical studies showing relationship between transparency and depth of
equity markets measured by indicators such as ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP);
John C. Coffee, Privatization and Corporate Governance:  The Lessons from Securities
Market Failure, in Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy Reforms 265,
274–81 (Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller eds., 2006) (comparing disappearance of
market trading for most of nearly 1,500 Czech issuers created by privatization in early
1990s with better performance of Polish capital markets and attributing difference in part
to very poor issuer disclosure in Czech Republic versus relatively high quality issuer
disclosure in Poland); Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of
Securities Regulation, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 333, 376–89 (2006) (collecting empirical studies
showing relationship between transparency and depth of equity markets measured by
indicators such as ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP); Hazem Daouk et al., Capital
Market Governance:  How Do Security Laws Affect Market Performance? 25 (Feb. 16,
2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=702682 (linking “increased enforcement of insider trading laws,
improved accounting standards . . . and a relaxation of short selling” to market
performance).
27. See, e.g., OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 49–57 (2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/DATAOECD/32/18/31557724.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (detailing importance of transparency in business); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s
Limits, 31 J. Legal Stud. 233, 243–44 (2002) (arguing that corporate law is ineffective
without transparency).
28. Bill 198 to the Ontario Securities Act, which effectively eliminated the need for
plaintiffs to establish reliance or loss causation, became effective on December 31, 2005.
Canada Introduces Securities Disclosure Liability, Can. Int’l Fin. L. Rev., Jan. 1, 2006, at 28,
28; see also Bradley Davis, Bill 198 Will Bring a New Era in Class Action Litigation in 2006,
Law. Wkly., Oct. 14, 2005, at 9.
29. Ryu Jin, Assembly Passes Watered-Down Class Action Bill, Korea Times, Dec. 23,
2003, at 2.
30. See Stefano M. Grace, Strengthening Investor Confidence in Europe:  U.S.-Style
Securities Class Actions and the Acquis Communautaire, 15 J. Transnat’l. L. & Pol’y 281,
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Finland are considering such reforms as well.31  And the Parmalat scandal
has led prominent academics to call for such reforms in Italy.32
In each of these countries, the full efflorescence of U.S.-style securi-
ties class actions is not something that can be expected anytime soon
given, depending on the particular country, some mix of the absence of
contingent fees for plaintiffs lawyers, the existence of a “loser pays” rule
concerning the victor’s legal fees, an “opt in” rather than an “opt out”
structure of class action, and the lack of explicit reference to securities
fraud as being among the claims that can be brought collectively.33  Still,
even these first tentative steps signal a change in atmosphere that sug-
gests an increasing chance that in the future, more issuer disclosure viola-
tions will lead to civil liability.  This change in atmosphere gains impor-
tance because it comes against the background of a recent body of
scholarly literature arguing that private damage suits play a special role in
the enforcement of securities disclosure laws.34
290–300 (2006) (noting effects of different political economies on allowing class action
litigation); Peter Geier, A Wary Europe Moves a Step Closer to Class Actions, Nat’l L.J.,
Dec. 5, 2006, at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1165244464820# (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (commenting on change in five years since Europe allowed plaintiffs
to bring increased class action securities suits); Press Release, German Fed. Ministry of
Justice, The German “Capital Markets Model Case Act” (Jan. 12, 2006), available at http://
www.bmj.bund.de/media/archive/1056.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing similarities and differences between U.S. and new German class action
systems).
31. Geier, supra note 30. R
32. Guido Ferrarini & Paolo Giudici, Financial Scandals and the Role of Private
Enforcement:  The Parmalat Case 3 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working
Paper No. 40/2005, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=730403 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting influence of media on quickly formed class action system in
Italian courts after Parmalat).
33. For recent overviews of “collective action” reforms in Europe, see Heather Smith,
Is America Exporting Class Actions to Europe?, Law.com In-House Counsel, Feb. 28, 2006,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticleIHC.jsp?id=1141047298349 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (documenting first product liability class action court case in
Europe); see also Linklaters, Global Dispute Resolution:  Class Action (2008), available at
http://linklaters.com/pdfs/publications/Litigation/Classactions.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing increasingly stringent U.S. class certification standards
designed to increase viability of similar systems in Europe).
34. See, e.g., Black, Legal and Institutional Preconditions, supra note 23, at 796 R
(explaining historical success of stock market listing standards requiring corporate
disclosure in increasing dispersed ownership); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes
& Andrei Shleifer, What Works In Securities Laws?, 61 J. Fin. 1, 19 (2006) (studying
empirical relationship between availability of private enforcement of securities laws and
capital market development); Katharina Pistor, Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, Law &
Finance in Transition Economies, 8 Econ. Transition 325, 348 (2000) (noting that effective
laws rather than rapidly changing laws are most likely to influence external financial
situations positively); Jennifer Arlen, Public Versus Private Enforcement of Securities
Fraud 12–19 (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(examining best allocation of public and private enforcement authority); Berglo¨f &
Claessens, supra note 23, at 15, 22 (distinguishing effects of private versus public R
enforcement mechanisms).
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II. THE SOCIAL VALUE OF DISCLOSURE AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF
WHETHER AN ISSUER IS OFFERING SECURITIES
What is the social interest in the level of an issuer’s disclosure?  Is it
more intense when an issuer is making a public offering of securities?  In
the discussion below, I conclude that for an established issuer trading in
an efficient market, society has an equally great interest in the issuer’s
disclosure regardless of whether it is offering securities.  Thus, a
mandatory disclosure regime should require the same level of disclosure
under both circumstances, and corporate decisionmakers should have
equally strong incentives to comply.  The system of civil liability for viola-
tion of these disclosure rules, as one source of compliance incentives,
should be designed accordingly.
The basis for this conclusion is that the primary social benefit from a
higher level of disclosure by established issuers is not the protection of
investors from unfair prices or risk.  Rather, the primary benefits are a
more efficient allocation of resources in the economy as a result of im-
proved corporate governance,35 increased capital market liquidity and
the consequent reduction in the cost of capital, and the reduction in re-
sources used by secondary market investors to gain advantages over each
other in a race to discover information already known by issuers but
unannounced.36  These benefits generally arise equally whether or not
the issuer is offering securities at any given moment.
35. Good corporate governance encourages firm managers to select more accurately
the most promising from among all the proposed investment projects in the economy and
to better operate their existing projects.
36. The importance of economic efficiency as a goal for disclosure regulation has
gained increasing recognition over the last twenty-five years.  Professor Coffee, for
example, states:  “Th[e] focus on fairness, rather than efficiency, is not surprising because
proponents of a mandatory disclosure system have historically stressed the former over the
latter.  Nonetheless, the strongest arguments for a mandatory disclosure system may be
efficiency-based.”  John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 717, 751 (1984) [hereinafter Coffee, Market
Failure]; see also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 Duke L.J. 711, 713 (2006) (“[T]he ultimate goal of securities regulation is
to attain efficient financial markets and thereby improve the allocation of resources in the
economy.”); Steven A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets:  Implications of
Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in Issues in Financial Regulation 177, 191
(Franklin Edwards ed., 1979) (discussing costs of compliance with disclosure
requirements).  For other perspectives on the efficiency-enhancing features of securities
disclosure, see Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock
Prices, 41 Duke L.J. 977, 985, 1006 (1992) (linking disclosure rules to accurate stock
pricing and efficient resource allocation); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a
Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1047, 1048, 1050 (1995) (arguing that
goal of disclosure should be focused on, and limited to, helping investors uncover
breaches of contractual or fiduciary obligations).
The growing importance of efficiency is also illustrated by the enactment in the
United States of The National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), which
amended the Securities Act to add section 2(b) providing that:
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A. Disclosure’s Irrelevance to Investor Protection
Disclosure by established issuers trading in major markets is not nec-
essary to protect investors against either unfair prices or risk.37  The mar-
kets in which the shares of such issuers trade are efficient.  According to
the efficient market hypothesis, the price of such a share is unbiased—
meaning it is as likely to be below the share’s actual value as above—
whether there is a lot of or very little information publicly available about
the issuer.  In other words, greater disclosure is not necessary to protect
investors from buying shares at prices that are, on average, unfair, i.e.,
greater than their actual values.  Issuer disclosure may reduce risk—on
average bringing price closer, on one side or the other, to actual value—
but it reduces only unsystematic risk.  Simply being diversified can protect
investors from this unsystematic risk much more effectively and at less
social cost than increasing issuer disclosure. The weakness of the investor
protection rationale for mandatory disclosure is important because, as
will be discussed in Part IV, it suggests that the compensatory justification
for awarding damages to investors who suffer secondary market trading
losses as a result of a mandatory disclosure violation is similarly weak.38
B. Disclosure’s Role in Improving Corporate Governance
Disclosure does, however, enhance efficiency by improving corpo-
rate decisions relating to which proposed new investment projects in the
economy are selected for implementation and how already existing
projects are operated.39  The starting point in establishing this proposi-
tion is to note that it is in the best interest of public shareholders that
management make these decisions in a way that maximizes share value,
i.e., maximizes the future expected cash flows for the rest of the life of
Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is
required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate
in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the
protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.
Id. § 106(a), 110 Stat. at 3424 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b)(2006))
(emphasis added).  The 1996 Act made an essentially identical amendment to the
Securities Exchange Act by the addition of section 3(f).  See id. § 106(b), 110 Stat. at
3424–25 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f)).
37. I have considered the points discussed here in significantly more detail elsewhere.
See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market:  Who Should Regulate
Whom, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2498, 2532–44 (1997) [hereinafter Fox, Disclosure in a
Globalizing Market] (rejecting fairness as compelling reason for disclosure and examining
risk reduction strategies other than disclosure).
38. See infra Part IV.B.1.
39. For further discussion and empirical evidence of how corporate disclosure and
the resulting increase in share price accuracy lead to the improved allocation of resources
in the real economy, see Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic
Performance:  The New Evidence, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 331, 338–41 (2003) [hereinafter Fox
et al., Share Price Accuracy] (examining empirical evidence suggesting disclosure can
increase economic efficiency).
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the firm, discounted to present value, paid to the holder of the share.
When corporations operate in competitive markets and are properly reg-
ulated to account for externalities, management decisions meeting this
criterion maximize overall social wealth as well.  Under these circum-
stances, at the margin, what the corporation pays for its inputs equals the
value of what it takes from society, and the price at which it sells its output
equals the value of what it gives back.  Thus decisions that maximize the
difference between the two—the net cash flows generated by the corpora-
tion over its life discounted to present value—maximize the corporation’s
contribution to society.  These are the same decisions as the ones that
maximize share value.
The decisions that maximize share value, however, are not necessa-
rily the decisions that maximize the utility of the managers.  This is partic-
ularly so in corporations with dispersed ownership, where no one share-
holder has a sufficiently large holding to have the incentives and ability to
monitor management closely.  The deviations between the decisions that
maximize managerial utility and the ones that maximize share value are
the “agency costs of management.”  The central task of corporate govern-
ance for dispersed ownership corporations—the typical ownership pat-
tern for large U.S. corporations—is to construct for managers a structure
of incentives—carrots and sticks—that cost-effectively minimizes these
agency costs of management.40
A higher level of disclosure reduces the agency costs of management
by two routes.  First, disclosure enhances the effectiveness of the legal
mechanisms for assuring good corporate governance by making the exer-
cise of the shareholder franchise more effective and assisting shareholder
enforcement of management’s fiduciary duties.  Second, disclosure en-
hances the effectiveness of the market mechanisms for aligning manage-
rial interests with those of shareholders:  the hostile takeover threat and
share price-based management compensation.
In each case, a higher level of reliable issuer disclosure improves cor-
porate governance by getting more information into the hands of the
relevant actors.  This increase in information goes beyond the raw con-
tents of the issuer’s disclosures.  The content of these disclosures reduces
the costs for analysts, the media, and speculative traders to perform their
respective jobs.  It does so both by providing feedstock for further investi-
gation and analysis and by reducing the costs of verification of already
available information.  These cost reductions increase the activity level of
each of these groups and hence result in the generation of further new
40. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308 (1976) (“The
principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for
the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the
agent.”).  For a discussion of the differences in typical ownership patterns between the
United States and other countries as well as differences in views concerning the goal of
share value maximization, see infra note 96 and accompanying text. R
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information.41  In the cases of the media and, to some extent, analysts,
this additional information is made public.  The rest of the information
generated by analysts is given confidentially to speculative traders, who
combine it with information they generate themselves, to trade in ways
that move prices.  The resulting movement in price is, of course, public,
and constitutes new information in and of itself.  Thus, for example, a
sudden drop in an issuer’s share price may signal that analysts or specula-
tive traders have developed information, not publicly disseminated, of
some management failing.  They are more likely to develop such informa-
tion with a higher level of reliable issuer disclosure.
1. Legal Mechanisms. — The shareholder franchise and the fiduciary
duties of management are legal mechanisms designed to encourage man-
agers to choose new investment projects and operate existing ones in
ways that maximize share value.  Disclosure enhances the effectiveness of
both these mechanisms and does so in a way unrelated to whether the
issuer is offering new securities.
a. Shareholder Franchise. — Disclosure can enhance the effective exer-
cise of the shareholder franchise because a better informed shareholder
is more likely, in an election for directors, to vote for candidates who will
maximize share value.  Similarly, such a shareholder is more likely to vote
in favor of the share value-maximizing outcome with respect to all other
matters subject to shareholder vote, such as an amendment to the articles
of incorporation, a merger, or ratification of a transaction in which man-
agement is interested.
Disclosure’s beneficial effects on shareholder voting works primarily
through the information it provides to the larger shareholder, i.e., the
institution or wealthy individual that holds between perhaps a fraction of
one percent and a few percent of the issuer’s outstanding shares.  For
most publicly traded corporations that lack a controlling shareholder or
group, shareholders of this kind hold in aggregate sufficiently large por-
tions of the total shares outstanding to play a potentially critical role in
voting.42  Unlike the typical small individual shareholder, the larger
41. For evidence that analyst coverage can reduce the agency costs associated with
dispersed share ownership, which separates ownership from control, see John A. Doukas et
al., Security Analysis, Agency Costs, and Company Characteristics, 56 Fin. Analysts J. 54, 54
(2000).
42. Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, Institutional Investors and Executive
Compensation 7 (Sept. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law
Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=468800 (finding, in sample including all
firms in the S&P 500 Index, the S&P Midcap Index, and the S&P Smallcap Index, average
aggregate institutional holdings to be 53.1% of shares outstanding and average holdings of
top five institutional investors in a firm to be 22% of outstanding shares and 44% of
aggregate institutional holdings); accord Anthony Saunders et al., The Impact of
Institutional Ownership on Corporate Operating Performance 14 (NYU Stern Finance,
Working Paper No. 03-033, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=468800 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (finding, in sample of firms in the S&P 100, that 59.3% of
shares outstanding were held by institutions and average holdings of top five institutional
investors in a firm is 20.1% of outstanding shares).
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shareholder has a big enough stake to make the kind of information pro-
vided for free by issuer disclosure worth learning.  But familiar collective
action problems mean that if this information were not provided for free,
the shareholder would not affirmatively seek to ferret out the information
on its own, at least to the extent that would be socially optimal.43
The corporate voting franchise has taken on new importance in re-
cent years.  Institutional investors have begun to vote in like fashion
against management with respect to certain kinds of corporate govern-
ance issues, in part prompted by information services such as Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS), which, while creating their own agency
problems, help mitigate the shareholder voting collective action prob-
lem.44  Admittedly, the focus of these institutional investors seems to be
toward systemic changes in U.S. corporate governance, where the same
information, relating to the superiority of one corporate governance
practice versus another, is relevant to each institution’s votes with respect
to many different corporations.45  Substantial evidence indicates, how-
ever, that activist hedge funds have been able to target individual firms46
and accomplish changes in management, managerial policy, and corpo-
rate governance in ways that appear to be share value enhancing.47  The
43. For a more detailed discussion of these collective action problems, see Merritt B.
Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 Law & Contemp. Prob. 113,
116–18 (1999) [hereinafter Fox, Required Disclosure].  Ideally the amount of information
that should be made available to each such larger shareholder would be the amount that a
single owner of the same enterprise would want from an agent who was managing the
enterprise if the enterprise instead had a single owner ownership structure.  This is
because there are substantial externalities when this larger shareholder receives
information since it increases the likelihood that the shareholder will exercise its franchise
in a way that will enhance the interests of all shareholders.
44. See Frank P. VanderPloeg, Legal Standards for Adoption of Executive
Compensation Programs and Contracts, in Tax Strategies for Corporate Acquisitions,
Dispositions, Spin-Offs, Joint Ventures, Financings, Reorganizations & Restructurings 2008,
at 167, 169 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning, Course Handbook Series No. 833, 2008).
45. Id.
46. The contrast between institutional investor votes and activist hedge fund votes is
established in Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance
and Corporate Control, at i (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 06-16, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=919881 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (“[H]edge fund activism differs from activism by traditional institutions in
several ways:  it is directed at significant changes in individual companies (rather than
small, systemic changes), it entails higher costs, and it is strategic and ex ante (rather than
intermittent and ex post).”).  But see Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder
Franchise, 93 Va. L. Rev. 675, 676 (2007) (arguing that shareholders generally have little
influence through their franchise).
47. William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets 11 (European
Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 80/2007, 2007), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=928689 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing hedge funds’
high record of success in using proxy system to achieve corporate change); Alon Brav et al.,
Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Performance, and Firm Performance 1 (Sept. 22, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://www.
fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2006/oct/hedge_fund.pdf (concluding that activists are at
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more firm-specific information these funds have, the more effective they
can be.  This firm-specific information is the kind of information that
comes from greater issuer disclosure.
More generally, recent years have seen a substantial movement seek-
ing to enlarge the shareholder role in selecting directors.  This has taken
a variety of forms:  the SEC’s intermittent consideration of rules to per-
mit, under certain circumstances, shareholder use of the company proxy
to nominate directors;48 corporations on their own adopting require-
ments that directors can be elected only upon the vote of an absolute
majority of their shareholders;49 and reforms to permit internet proxy
voting.50
least partially successful at achieving corporate change two-thirds of the time and that
there are statistically significant abnormal returns in the range of five to seven percent
around time of announcement that hedge fund has become active with respect to
particular issuer).
48. The SEC, by twice putting out for comment proposals to provide shareholder
access to the company proxy under certain defined circumstances, flirted with increasing
the shareholder role in the selection of directors of public companies.  See Shareholder
Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,913,
72 Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,469 (proposed Aug. 3, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240);
Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,785 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249 & 274).  Ultimately, however, it decided to maintain
the Rule 14a-8(i)(8) exclusion of election-related shareholder proposals from company
proxy materials and to amend the rule to clarify that it excludes not just proposals for a
specific person to be nominated or elected director, but also proposals relating to the
procedures for nomination and election.  Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election
of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 56,914, Investment Company Act Release No.
28,075, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450, 70,453 (Dec. 11, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240.14a-
8(i)(8)) (2008).
49. Notwithstanding the retrenchment at the SEC, increasingly corporations have
adopted on their own a majority voting standard for director elections.  See AT&T Inc.:
Majority Voting Standard Is Adopted for Some Elections, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 2006, at A11
(announcing amendment to AT&T bylaws to adopt majority voting standard for director
nominees in uncontested elections); Neal E. Brunette & John D. Stoll, GM Board Declines
to Discuss Meeting on Alliance, Turnaround, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 2006, at A2 (noting that
GM’s board amended company bylaws “to allow majority voting in the election of
directors”); Jared A. Favole, Delaware Lets Firms Enact Rule on Majority Vote, Wall St. J.
Online, Oct. 4, 2006, available at LexisNexis, WSJNL file (citing Clorox, Co., Agilent
Technologies Inc., Martek Biosciences Corp., and Wal-Mart Stores Inc. as recent examples
of Delaware-incorporated companies “to enact majority-vote standards with teeth”);
McDonald’s Corp.:  Bylaws Are Amended to Address Uncontested Director Elections, Wall
St. J., Nov. 15, 2006, at B12 (noting that McDonald’s Corp. amended bylaws to adopt
majority voting standard for directors in uncontested elections); Kara Scannell, SEC Proxy
Plan May Spur Debate—Agency Takes up Issues of Shareholders’ Access, Directors’
Accountability, Wall St. J., July 25, 2007, at A3 (announcing SEC vote on whether to allow
shareholders to amend election-related bylaws).
50. See Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 52,926,
Investment Company Act Release No. 74,598, 80 Fed. Reg. 74,598, 74,598 (proposed Dec.
15, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249 & 274) (“We are proposing
amendments to the proxy rules . . . to furnish proxy materials to shareholders by posting
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b. Fiduciary Duties. — A high disclosure regime enhances the effec-
tive enforcement of management’s fiduciary duties because managers are
not otherwise likely to provide information voluntarily about their
breaches of fiduciary duty.51  A rule requiring the issuer to report all ma-
terial transactions it enters into in which managers or directors have an
interest provides an example of how mandatory disclosure can help.
Once the existence of such a conflict of interest transaction is known,
shareholders can force management to meet its burden of establishing
the validity of the transaction.  To do this, management must show either
that appropriate procedures have been followed in the transaction’s au-
thorization to remove the taint of the conflict or, alternatively, that the
terms of the transaction are fair to the issuer.  Without shareholders
knowing such a transaction exists, this fiduciary breach-reducing burden
placed on management by corporate law is meaningless.52
Arguably, a manager willing to engage in a transaction that is unfair
to the corporation would also be willing to violate disclosure rules in or-
der to cover up the transaction, in which case disclosure regulations
would have no deterrent effect.  This argument, however, ignores that
the transaction itself, or its effects, may ultimately become visible, at
which time it may be easier, from a factfinding perspective, for a court to
conclude that there has been a disclosure violation than that unfairness
has occurred.  More important, the habit of engaging in a wide range of
required disclosures may make it harder for a manager to rationalize
breaking the disclosure regulations than to rationalize entering into a
questionable transaction that the manager persuades himself is good for
the corporation as well as himself.  This is especially so because disclosure
regulation tends to bring with it the involvement of  gatekeepers, such as
accountants and lawyers.53
2. Market Mechanisms. — A high level of disclosure also reduces the
agency costs of management through its beneficial effects on two market
them on an Internet Web site and providing shareholders with notice of the availability of
proxy materials.”).
51. See Mahoney, supra note 36, at 1089–95 (conducting efficiency analysis of R
mandatory disclosure regime).
52. For a more detailed discussion of these points, see Fox, Required Disclosure,
supra note 43, at 118–20 (“Absent required disclosure, managers are not inclined to R
provide information that might suggest the existence of a breach of fiduciary duty.
Without that information, it is often impossible for shareholders to know about the
potential breach.”); see also Roe, supra note 27, at 269–71 (discussing value of corporate R
law in “protecting distant shareholders”).
53. Corporate managers and directors also, of course, have a duty of care.  Because of
the business judgment rule, however, successful legal action against breaches of this duty
are extremely rare.  See Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24
Del. J. Corp. L. 787, 801 (1999) (noting rarity of adjudicated breaches of duty of care).
Disclosure, however, does enhance the functioning of substitute deterrents to duty of care
violations:  the shareholder franchise discussed here and market mechanisms for reducing
managerial agency costs—the takeover threat and share price-based compensation—
discussed immediately below.  See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 36, at 741–42. R
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mechanisms that help align managerial interests with those of sharehold-
ers:  the hostile takeover threat and share price-based management
compensation.
a. The Market for Corporate Control. — More information, with the re-
sulting increase in price accuracy, improves the control market’s effec-
tiveness in limiting the agency costs of management.  A potential acquirer
who believes that a target is mismanaged must determine whether it is
worthwhile to pay the costs necessary to acquire the target.  To make this
determination, the potential acquirer must assess what the target would
be worth in its hands.  This assessment is inherently risky.  Greater disclo-
sure, however, reduces this risk.  Because the potential acquirer’s man-
agement is risk averse, this reduction in the riskiness of its assessment
means that a smaller apparent deviation between incumbent manage-
ment decisionmaking and the decisions that would maximize share value
is needed to impel the potential acquirer into action.54
With greater disclosure, incumbent managers will therefore be less
tempted to operate existing projects in ways that sacrifice profits to satisfy
their personal aims, to implement negative net present value (NPV)
projects in order to maintain or enlarge their empires, or to hold onto
assets that would be more valuable in the hands of another firm.  And
those who nevertheless do these things are more likely to be replaced.
Disclosure performs this helpful role regardless of whether the issuer is
offering new securities.
b. Share Price-Based Managerial Compensation. — Greater disclosure
can likewise reduce the agency costs of management by increasing the
use of share price-based managerial compensation.  The problem for
managers with share price-based compensation, compared with straight
salary with the same expected value, is the undiversifiable, unsystematic
risk it imposes on the manager.  More disclosure makes share prices more
accurate, which reduces this unsystematic risk.  As a result, a manager,
when offered a total compensation package with a given expected value,
will be willing to take a larger portion of it in share price-based form if
the issuer is operating under a high disclosure regime.55
54. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Finance and Industrial Performance in a Dynamic
Economy:  Theory, Practice, and Policy 84–91 (1987) [hereinafter Fox, Finance and
Industrial Performance] (analyzing managerial decisionmaking based on return/risk
ratio); Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 37, at 2546–48 (“[F]ear of a R
takeover will motivate incumbent management to make decisions more in accord with the
best interests of shareholders than it might otherwise make.”); Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Discouraging Rivals:  Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies 1302
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W4145, 1997), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=227981 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[M]anagerial rent-
seeking affects not only the level of investment, but also the form.”).
55. Empirical evidence demonstrates that a reduction in the riskiness of an issuer’s
stock will increase the proportion of stock-based compensation that a manager is willing to
accept.  See Clifford G. Holderness, Randall S. Kroszner & Dennis P. Sheehan, Were the
Good Old Days That Good?  Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great
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With a larger portion of compensation in share price-based form, as
with a more effective market for corporate control, incumbent managers
will have greater incentives not to operate existing projects in ways that
sacrifice profits to satisfy their personal aims and not to implement nega-
tive NPV projects in order to maintain or enlarge their empires.
The scandals of the early 2000s, which mostly arose out of a manage-
ment desire to report higher than actual earnings in order to maintain or
increase share price,56 arguably illustrate that share price compensation
is more effective at promoting disclosure violations than good manage-
ment.  There are two responses.  First, these problems arose largely from
the design of the compensation packages, which had insufficient empha-
sis on longer-run share performance.57  Long-run share performance is
much harder to manipulate through earnings management.58  Second,
the scandals simply point out the importance of having effective enforce-
ment of disclosure rules, without which share price-based compensation’s
high-powered incentives for genuinely good corporate performance will
not work.
C. Disclosure’s Potentially More Direct Effect on Project Choice
Disclosure-induced increased share price accuracy for established
firms may also more directly improve the selection of proposed new in-
vestment projects in the economy, though the importance of this more
direct route is debatable.  Strict, classical corporate finance theory sug-
gests that share price accuracy’s effect on project choice occurs only as a
result of its impact on the quality of corporate governance, through its
enhancement of the various mechanisms discussed above that prompt
managers to maximize share value.  The classical theory posits that when
an established issuer with sufficient internal funds considers a proposed
investment project, the terms at which outside funds can be obtained
should not influence the decision of a share value-maximizing manage-
ment as to whether to implement the project.  A more nuanced, institu-
tionally oriented view, however, suggests that share price will affect an
issuer’s decision whether to undertake a proposed investment project.
Under this second view, however, share price will usually have this effect
regardless of the source of the funds tapped to implement the project,
Depression, 54 J. Fin. 435, 437 (1999) (“[R]eduction in costs and increase in benefits of
managerial ownership provide an explanation for the increase in managerial
ownership . . . .”).
56. Coffee, Gatekeepers, supra note 19, at 55–56, 62–64. R
57. Id. at 55.
58. The most common ways of inflating current earnings are to recognize revenues
prematurely, to postpone recognition of expenses, and to capitalize expenditures that will
not in fact contribute to future profitability and hence are properly categorized as
expenses.  Each of these acts will reduce earnings in the future and therefore have a
depressing effect on future share price.  Thus it is harder for managers to manipulate
earnings to increase their personal rewards if the share price-based compensation plan
emphasizes the longer run and hence captures this later depression in price.
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whether it be publicly offered equity, privately placed securities, bank
loans, or internally generated funds.
Whichever view is correct, the important point to grasp from the dis-
cussion below is that disclosure by an established, publicly traded issuer is
not significantly more socially important when the issuer is offering new
securities to the market than it is at other times.  Either share price has
no effect on the decision whether to invest, even when shares are offered,
or share price does affect the investment decision, but does so regardless
of whether a share offering is the source of finance.
1. Classical Finance Theory. — Classical finance theory’s conclusion
that an issuer’s share price should not affect its project choice decisions
reflects the basic Modigliani and Miller tenet that investment and financ-
ing decisions should be separate.59  The share value-maximizing rule for
real investment decisions is that the issuer should not undertake a pro-
posed investment project unless the project has a positive or zero NPV,
i.e., that the expected future net revenues from the project discounted to
present value exceed or equal the project’s cost.60  The discount rate is
determined by the market price of alternative expected cash flows availa-
ble for purchase in the market that have comparable amounts of undiver-
sifiable risk.61  Thus the two factors needed to make the NPV determina-
tion—the expected net revenues from the project and the discount
rate—are both independent of the issuer’s current share price.  Only
projects with positive NPVs allow the firm to earn a higher risk-adjusted
expected return on the amount needed to fund the project than inves-
tors can receive by investing these same funds in the market.  Thus only
positive NPV projects add to the value of holding a share.62
The share value-maximizing rule for finance is that the issuer should
raise external funds if and only if the funds received are greater than the
discounted present value of the expected future cash flows that must be
paid out in return.  In the case of external equity finance, the funds re-
ceived are the share price (less the transaction costs of the offering), and
the future cash flows that must be paid out are expected dividends and
other shareholder distributions on the newly issued shares for the rest of
the issuer’s life.63  Thus, for a manager seeking to maximize the value of
her firm’s currently outstanding shares, share price is important to the
finance decision concerning whether to raise funds by issuing new shares,
but not to the real investment decision of whether to implement any par-
59. See Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the
Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411, 413–14 (1961) (“Having established that [a firm’s
current market value] is unaffected by the current dividend decision it is easy to go on to
show that [it] must also be unaffected by any future dividend decisions as well.”).
60. Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 9, at 17. R
61. Id. at 215–17.
62. By the same logic, implementing projects with a zero NPV has no effect on share
value and implementing negative NPV projects decreases share value.
63. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Law and Economics of Dividend Policy, 67 Va. L.
Rev. 699, 701–02 (1981) (describing “irrelevance” of dividend policy on share value).
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ticular project.64  Only the investment decision affects the allocation of
real resources in the economy and hence its capacity to enhance social
welfare through the provision of goods and services for consumption.
2. Institutional Finance Theory. — There is nevertheless a significant
chance that share price will affect a firm’s real investment decision
whether to undertake a proposed investment project.  This is obvious
when the firm does not have sufficient internal funds to finance the pro-
ject and share price is inaccurately low.  Under these circumstances, if a
public offering of equity would, at the accurate price, represent the least
cost method of external finance, implementing the project may not be
share value-maximizing even if the project has a positive NPV.  This is
because funding the project by a share offering at an inaccurately low
price may, due to the dilution resulting from the higher number of
shares that must be issued to raise a given amount of funds, depress share
value more than the adoption of a positive NPV project would increase
share value.  If, for example, because of the agency costs of debt, alterna-
tive forms of external finance are sufficiently more costly than equity fi-
nance would be if the share price were accurate, then these alternative
forms of external finance would also not be used.  Hence, because the
share price is inaccurately low, the project would not be undertaken even
though it is socially desirable.
If share price is inaccurately high, a firm that has only a negative
NPV project idea may both engage in a sale of new equity, as classical
finance theory would suggest it should, and also, contrary to classical the-
ory, implement the project.  Raising the funds through a new equity sale
followed immediately by a distribution of the proceeds might be awk-
ward.65  Using the cash to implement the project instead, even though
doing so is not share value-maximizing, would avoid this awkwardness
and at the same time satisfy the managerial preference for larger firm
size.  Thus an inaccurately high share price may lead to the implementa-
tion of socially undesirable projects.
The institutional finance theory account so far might appear to sug-
gest that share price accuracy, and hence disclosure, matters more when
an issuer is considering a public offering of shares.  But there is more to
the story.  Even where the firm has sufficient internal funds or a public
64. The importance of these rationales for separating the finance and investment
decisions emerges in the case of a firm that has overpriced shares, but has only a negative
NPV investment project under consideration, i.e., the expected rate of return on the
project is below what shareholders could earn if they received an amount of dividends
equal to the cost of the project and reinvested this amount in the market in securities with
risk comparable to that of the project.  Separating the finance from the investment
decisions suggests that the firm should sell additional shares but should not invest the
proceeds in the project.  The proceeds should instead be paid out to the shareholders as
additional dividends.  Id.
65. Such a distribution would signal that the issuer sold its immediately preceding
new issue of shares simply because it believed they were overpriced in the market.  This
signal might complicate shareholder relations and future sales of equity.
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equity offering is not the least-cost method, share price may affect
whether the project is implemented.  On the supply side, share price can
affect the cost of financing a project by influencing the terms demanded
by the intermediaries constituting the other available external sources of
funds.66  On the demand side, for several reasons, an inaccurate share
price can affect management’s willingness to use funds to implement a
new project, whatever their source.
The first demand-side effect of an inaccurate share price is that it can
affect management’s willingness to use debt financing because of the
prospect that the firm will subsequently want to counterbalance any new
debt with new equity financing in order to maintain a perceived optimal
debt/equity ratio.  If share price is inaccurately low, managers may be
unwilling to take on additional debt to finance a positive NPV project
because of the prospect that the counterbalancing equity financing may,
through dilution, become too costly to current shareholders.67  A second
demand-side effect of an inaccurate share price relates to its distorting
effect on the determination by firm management of the appropriate dis-
count rate with which to calculate the future expected cash flows from a
proposed project.  This determination should, in theory, use only the
pricing of securities in the market representing alternative cash flows that
66. See Homer Kripke, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure:  Regulation in Search of a
Purpose 123 (1979) (discussing importance of “market price of shares” for “the company’s
borrowing power, the interest rate it pays on its borrowings, and the value of its ‘paper’ in
mergers and acquisitions”).
67. Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 9, at 488–90.  In the situation where top R
management is reasonably confident that the share price is too low because it has
information that has not been credibly disclosed to the market, there may be a corrective
to this distorting effect of an inaccurate share price. Normally such a deviation between
share price and management’s perception of share value will disappear fairly soon, before
the equity offering to rebalance the debt/equity ratio would need to occur.  This corrective
is less likely to be at work, however, in the case of an issuer that does not disclose at a high
level because it is not subject to rigorous mandatory disclosure regulations and does not
otherwise have a policy of providing high disclosure.  Two factors make the manager of
such an issuer less likely to perceive the inaccuracy in share price.  First, the manager
receives a smaller flow of information in the first place.  The exercise of gathering and
presenting information for SEC filings is consciousness-raising.  Thus, less of the negative
or positive information that exists somewhere within the firm (perhaps in some kind of
disaggregated form) makes its way into top management’s awareness because top
management is not forced to answer the questions that would be asked as part of a high
disclosure regime.  See Fox, Required Disclosure, supra note 43, at 123–25 (discussing role R
of disclosure requirements in raising managerial consciousness); Louis Lowenstein,
Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance:  You Manage What You Measure, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 1335, 1342 (1996) (describing benefits of disclosure requirements).
Second, managers do not have a monopoly of wisdom on the implications of a
particular piece of information within their possession for their firm’s future cash flows.
When disclosed, the impact of the piece on price reflects the combination of the piece
itself combined with the expertise and other information held by myriad persons in the
market who analyze the piece’s implications.  When less information is disclosed, part of
the reason that the price is less accurate relates to these factors that are outside the
understanding of managers and hence of which they are not aware.
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have an amount of undiversifiable risk comparable to that of the pro-
posed project.  Because companies with similar existing projects often
have many other different kinds of projects as well, however, identifying
which securities are claims on cash flows that in fact come close to having
unsystematic risk comparable to that of the proposed project is inexact at
best.  And even if firms with such securities can be properly identified,
determining what their prices say about the appropriate discount rate is
difficult because it requires assessing, and separating out, the market’s
assumptions about the expected rates of growth in the other firms’ cash
flows implicit in their share prices.  As a result of these difficulties, man-
agers, in their determination of the discount rate to use to determine the
NPV of a proposed project, may be influenced by the discount rate im-
plied by the price earnings ratio of their own firm.  To the extent that
they do this, an inverse relationship develops between the discount rate
they use to calculate the project’s NPV and the issuer’s share price.  This
leads to more projects appearing to have positive NPV than is actually the
case when share price is inaccurately high and the opposite when it is
inaccurately low.68
Finally, because of concern with public perceptions, low share price
can more generally constrain the use of both external and internal
funds.69  This constraint arises because a low share price can trigger inves-
tor attention.  Since a primary investor concern is that firms retain too
much cash flow that they invest in negative NPV projects,70 a low share
price may put management on the defensive even when in fact it has
positive NPV project proposals available for implementation.
D. Disclosure’s Role in Increasing Secondary Market Liquidity
Theory and empirical evidence both suggest that greater disclosure
increases liquidity and reduces a firm’s cost of capital.  To the extent that
liquidity can be increased cost effectively, scarce resources in our econ-
omy will be allocated more efficiently.
1. The Theoretical Link Between Disclosure and Efficiency. — More disclo-
sure reduces illiquidity in the secondary market for an issuer’s shares.
Insiders and their tippees can make supranormal profits by engaging in
trades based on nonpublic information.  Market makers and specialists,
who ordinarily do not know the identity of the person placing a buy or
sell order, cover the expected costs of being on the other side of such
trades through their “bid/ask” spread, i.e., the extent to which the price
at which they accept buyer orders exceeds the price at which they accept
68. Again, if management knows that the share price is too high or too low because of
information it possesses, the inaccurate price may not have this effect.  But the managers of
lower disclosure issuers are likely to be less aware of price inaccuracies.  See supra note 67. R
69. See Fox, Finance and Industrial Performance, supra note 54, at 282–87 (noting R
that “a company with a good image will have a good chance of making a success out of a
new investment” and describing factors that contribute to image).
70. See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. R
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seller orders.71  The bigger the spread, the less liquid the issuer’s shares,
and the less valuable they are to hold.  When an issuer offers shares in the
primary market, the larger investors anticipate this spread will be in the
future, the lower the price at which the issuer can sell the shares and
hence the higher the issuer’s cost of capital.72  By reducing the amount of
nonpublic information and hence the opportunities for insiders and tip-
pees to engage in such trades, ongoing periodic disclosure should there-
fore reduce bid/ask spreads, increase liquidity, and, consequently, re-
duce the cost of capital.73
2. Empirical Evidence that Disclosure Increases Liquidity. — Empirical
support for the proposition that disclosure increases liquidity and
reduces the cost of capital comes from recent work by Hail and Leuz
concerning the effect on a foreign firm’s cost of capital when it cross-lists
on the NYSE or NASDAQ, which subjects the firm to the U.S. Exchange
Act disclosure regime.74  Because the United States has stricter, more ef-
fective disclosure rules than other countries, such a cross-listing requires
the firm to provide a higher level of disclosure than before.75  Foreign
issuers experience a price jump when undertaking such cross-listings.
71. Larry Harris, Trading & Exchanges:  Market Microstructure for Practitioners
287–88, 299–302 (2003) (describing “bid/ask” spreads); Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R.
Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously
Informed Traders, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 71, 72 (1985) (same).
72. The cost of capital is larger because the prospect of a larger bid/ask spread results
in the same issuer’s expected future cash flow being discounted to present value at a
higher discount rate.
73. For models working out these points more rigorously, see Robert E. Verrecchia,
Essays on Disclosure, 32 J. Acct. & Econ. 97, 164–72 (2001) (finding that disclosure
reduces information asymmetries and lowers cost of capital); David Easley & Maureen
O’Hara, Information and the Cost of Capital 32–33 (Nov. 2001) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=300715
(same).
74. See Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, Cost of Capital Effects and Changes in Growth
Expectations Around U.S. Cross Listings 40 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Fin
Research Paper No. 46/2004, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=938230 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Hail & Leuz, U.S. Cross Listings]; see also Luzi
Hail & Christian Leuz, International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital:  Do Legal
Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter?, 44 J. Acct. Res. 485, 524 (2006) (finding,
from cross-country comparison, inverse relationship between effectiveness of securities
regimes and cost of capital).  For other empirical studies showing that greater disclosure
leads to increased liquidity and a lower cost of capital, see Christine A. Botosan, Disclosure
Level and the Cost of Equity Capital, 72 Acct. Rev. 323, 325 (1997) (presenting empirical
findings that for firms that attract low analyst following, greater disclosure is associated
with lower cost of equity capital); Christian Leuz & Robert E. Verrecchia, The Economic
Consequences of Increased Disclosure, 38 J. Acct. Res. 91, 113 (Supp. 2000) (presenting
empirical findings, from study of German firms, that increased disclosure leads to lower
cost of capital); Michael Welker, Disclosure Policy, Information Asymmetry, and Liquidity
in Equity Markets, 11 Contemp. Acct. Res. 801, 801 (1995) (presenting empirical findings
“that a well-regarded disclosure policy reduces information asymmetry and hence increases
liquidity in equity markets”).
75. Hail & Leuz, U.S. Cross Listings, supra note 74, at 1. R
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Hail and Leuz decompose this price jump in order to isolate the effect of
the cross-listing on the market’s expectations of the firm’s future cash
flows from any effect on the rate at which the market discounts these cash
flows, i.e., from any effect on the firm’s cost of capital.76  The market’s
anticipation of greater ongoing disclosure following the cross-listing can
increase its expectations of the firm’s future cash flows for two reasons.
One is signaling:  The firm’s willingness to submit its claims of a bright
future to greater scrutiny can increase the outside market’s perception of
the level of the firm’s future cash flow even assuming no change in the
future behavior of the firm and hence no change in actual cash flows.
The other reason is bonding:  Greater scrutiny will change firm behavior
in ways that will increase actual future cash flows.77  While a substantial
portion of the price jump following a U.S. cross-listing can be explained
by the change in expectations caused by signaling and bonding, there
remains a significant residual that can best be explained by the cross-
listing having reduced the rate at which future expected cash flows are
discounted and hence the firm’s cost of capital decreases.  Hail and Leuz
attribute this lower cost of capital to the increase in the expected level of
disclosure that accompanies a U.S. cross-listing.78  They find no compara-
ble results for a foreign firm’s over-the-counter (OTC) cross-listing in the
United States (the so-called “pink sheets” market), or for a Rule 144A
offering (under which unregistered shares of foreign issuers can be
traded in the United States among large institutional investors79), neither
of which triggers the need to comply with the U.S. periodic disclosure
requirements.80
3. Efficiency Effects of Higher Liquidity. — Equity markets involve the
purchase and sale of future dollars.  The sellers in primary equity markets
are issuers or entrepreneurs.  The shares they sell are claims on future
dollars in the form of expected future dividend streams.  In return, these
issuers and entrepreneurs receive current dollars that they invest in real
investment projects.  In contrast, the sellers in secondary equity markets
are shareholders who wish to obtain current dollars by giving up already
outstanding shares, i.e., previously issued claims to an issuer’s future divi-
dend streams.  A secondary market seller of shares gives up these claims
on future dollars to obtain current dollars for one of three reasons:  to
consume more than her current income, to readjust her financial portfo-
lio for risk-related reasons, or to speculate that the share price will fall in
the future (relative to a future price that reflects the market expected
76. Id. at 2 (explaining model that analyzes “ex-ante estimates of firms’ cost of equity
capital implied by market prices and analyst forecasts” in order to isolate issue of cash
flow).
77. Id. at 7–8 (explaining effects of bonding on companies under increased U.S.
disclosure requirements and threats of SEC enforcement and shareholder suits).
78. Id. at 1.
79. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2008).
80. See Hail & Leuz, supra note 74, at 40. R
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rate of return for cash flows with the share’s same level of systematic risk).
The buyers of the shares purchased in both the primary and secondary
markets are the counterparts of the sellers in the secondary market.  They
give up current dollars to obtain claims on future dollars for one of three
reasons:  to have a place to store the savings generated by their current
consumption being less than their current income, to readjust their fi-
nancial portfolios, or to speculate that the share price will rise in the fu-
ture (again relative to a future price that reflects the expected market
return).  Whichever reason motivates a potential buyer, if she anticipates
a low level of liquidity in the secondary market at whatever time she
might wish to sell in the future, the share she is considering purchasing is
worth less to her.  Her anticipation of a high bid/ask spread at the time
that she sells means that she anticipates a lower sale price.  As a result, she
will not be willing to pay as much to purchase the shares today.
The depressing effect on the price of shares offered today in the
primary market from the anticipation of a low level of liquidity in the
future secondary market creates inefficiency in the economy to the extent
that the level of expected liquidity could be cost effectively increased.  In
welfare economics terms, the anticipated illiquidity results in a “wedge”
between the value of what the savers—purchasers of future dollars—ex-
pect to receive and what the entrepreneurs or issuers—suppliers of future
dollars in the form of future dividend streams—expect to give up.81  The
same level of expected future dividend stream is worth less to savers today
if liquidity in the future is expected to be low than if it is expected to be
high.  As a result, resources are allocated less efficiently.82
At the margin, with a given supply of investment opportunities, a
reduction in expected future secondary market illiquidity makes each ex-
pected future dollar of expected dividend stream more valuable and sell
for a higher price today and hence lowers the cost of capital.  In longer-
run equilibrium, such a reduction in expected illiquidity will likely both
stimulate entrepreneurial activity, drawing out more investment opportu-
nities since they can be sold for more, and increase the amount of savings
supplied, since an expected dollar of dividend will be more valuable.  The
important point is that these liquidity-based efficiency benefits of disclo-
sure are no greater at the particular moment that an issuer is offering
shares than they are at any other moment, because they relate to the
expectation of the level of liquidity in the future secondary market for the
shares involved.
81. See William J. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis 517 (4th ed.
1977) (describing market imperfections from welfare economics perspective).
82. See Harris, supra note 71, at 214–15 (describing public benefits of liquid R
markets).  More liquidity also lowers the transaction costs associated with speculative
trading based on acquiring a variety of bits of publicly available information and analyzing
them to make more accurate predictions of an issuer’s cash flows.  It therefore stimulates
such activity, and in the process increases share price accuracy.  Id.  Thus disclosure’s
enhancement of liquidity also provides a second, more indirect way that it improves share
price accuracy, with the attendant social benefits described supra Parts II.B and II.C.
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E. Minimizing Information Costs:  The Issuer as Least Cost Provider and
Precaution Costs
Many secondary market speculative investors expend resources in a
race with each other to obtain information useful for better predicting an
issuer’s future cash flows.  Those who obtain the information first have a
trading advantage over the others.  There are social benefits associated
with this race because the knowledge discovered is impounded in share
price through trading and adds to its accuracy.  As we have seen, more
accurate share prices improve corporate governance and hence the effi-
ciency of resource allocation.  But depending on the particular informa-
tion involved, the cost of the resources expended in the race may exceed
the social benefit from the increase in share price accuracy.83  This is very
likely to be the case where the information either is already known to the
issuer or can be easily discovered by it.  In these situations, the issuer is
clearly the least cost provider.  Thus an additional function of issuer dis-
closure is to save the resources that investors would otherwise expend on
the race to be first to determine these types of information.84
Moreover, the more credible the issuer’s statements, the less investor
resources need to be expended as a matter of precaution to try to con-
firm what the issuer has stated.  One source of credibility is the prospect
of the issuer facing sanctions, including civil liability, should the informa-
tion it provides not be accurate.  Other sources of credibility include pri-
vately imposed sanctions (from a stock exchange, for example); certifica-
tion by a gatekeeper that risks its reputational capital or faces possible
liability if an issuer’s statement is false; or just an established reputation
for truthfulness on the part of the issuer itself.
Again, the efficiency benefits of credible issuer disclosure as a way of
reducing real resources spent on the race to be first and on precautionary
checking are no greater at the particular moment that an issuer is offer-
ing shares than at any other point in time.
F. Implications for Mandatory Disclosure Design
This review shows that issuer disclosure has substantially equal social
value whether or not the firm is selling equity at the time.  Upon reflection, this
showing is obvious in the case of the impact of disclosure on the effective-
ness of the shareholder franchise, fiduciary duties, the market for corpo-
rate control, share price-based managerial compensation, market liquid-
ity, and minimizing information costs.  But as we have seen, it is also
83. See Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward
to Inventive Activity, 61 Am. Econ. Rev. 561, 573 (1971) (stating that gains from obtaining
information must be offset by costs of acquisition and dissemination).
84. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 Va. L. Rev. 669, 681–82 (1984) (arguing that mandatory
disclosure reduces duplicative information searches).
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largely true in terms of the more direct effects of disclosure on project
choice.
The fact that disclosure is socially equally valuable whether or not
the issuer is currently engaging in an equity offering has two important
implications.  First, the disclosure rules should require the same level of
disclosure regardless of whether the issuer is selling securities.  For estab-
lished, publicly traded issuers, this is largely true as a formal matter today
in the United States.  Indeed, this has been the guiding principle of the
movement over the last twenty-five years away from a transactionally
based system of disclosure regulation toward a system of company regis-
tration.85  Second, and a key point of this Article, civil liability should be
structured to give corporate decisionmakers equally strong incentives for
disclosure regulation compliance whether or not the firm is publicly of-
fering equity at the time.  As we will see, this is not true today in the
United States because the system of civil liability is still built on the vestig-
ial remains of the old transactional emphasis in disclosure regulation.
With these goals in mind, it is important to note that when an issuer
is making a public sale of equity, the issuer has an extra motive to defy
mandatory disclosure regulations not otherwise at work.  The extra mo-
tive arises because suppression of negative required information will per-
mit the issuer to sell the offered securities for more, and hence benefit
directly from the higher price.  Thus, at the time of equity sales, the civil
liability system must provide an antidote for this extra motive on top of its
ordinary incentives for compliance.
III. AVOIDING FINANCING SOURCE DISTORTIONS
Efficiency requires management choices between internal and exter-
nal finance and among sources of external finance to reflect the social
costs and benefits of the choices involved.  Because the social value of an
issuer’s disclosure is equally great regardless of what finance source an
issuer uses, a system that imposes a greater expected civil liability for a
disclosure violation (net of any expected private gains from the violation)
when managers choose one kind of financing over another introduces an
inefficient distortion.
The current liability system in the United States, which arose out of
the traditional transactionally focused approach to disclosure regulation,
violates the principle that the civil liability system should avoid such dis-
tortions.  It imposes a significantly heightened risk of liability on manag-
ers and other nonissuer actors if a violation occurs when an issuer is pub-
licly offering new securities.  Unlike the heightened liability imposed on
the issuer at the time of a public offering, the heightened liability im-
posed on managers and other nonissuer actors is not counterbalanced by
85. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text (examining logic and history of R
mandatory registration).
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greater private gains from the violation.86  Thus, the heightened liability
on persons other than the issuer discourages public equity offerings rela-
tive to other sources of investment funds, both internal and external.
A. Increased Reliance on Internally Generated Funds
Internally generated funds represent one alternative to funds raised
by a public offering of equity.  Consider, however, the position of the
managers of a firm with insufficient internal funds to finance all its posi-
tive NPV projects.  Given the heightened liability that a public offering of
equity imposes on nonissuer actors, the managers may decide not to seek
such financing.  Doing so would increase their own liability risks for any
disclosure violations that may exist in the issuer’s filings.  Even more im-
portant, perhaps, is the potential liability on the part of the underwriters,
the expected costs of which will be passed on to the issuer in the form of
higher fees that are avoided if the issuer does not finance by such public
offering.
Two kinds of social losses may flow from this decision.  First, some of
the issuer’s positive NPV projects may not be funded.  There are no inter-
nal funds available for them and, as will be discussed below, the illiquidity
of privately offered securities causes such securities to sell at a discount.
This discount can be sufficient to make some otherwise attractive positive
NPV projects not worthwhile.
Second, when some firms leave positive NPV projects unimple-
mented because of a decision not to seek external funds, a cover is pro-
vided for the inefficient behavior of another group of firms.  These firms
have more internally generated funds than they have positive and zero
net value projects and are using these surplus internal funds to finance
negative NPV projects.  The fact that a firm is not seeking external fi-
nance is a signal that it may be one of these surplus internal funds firms
investing in negative net value projects.  This signal blurs, however, when
firms with unimplemented positive NPV projects are also not seeking ex-
ternal finance.
This blurring of the signal is a serious problem because both theory
and empirical studies suggest that managers with surplus internally gener-
ated funds typically use at least some of these funds to implement nega-
tive NPV projects rather than paying them out in dividends.  Because
managers tend to benefit both from the process of growth and from run-
ning a firm of larger absolute size, managers who still have internal funds
available after they have exhausted their firm’s positive and zero NPV in-
vestment opportunities are likely to find it in their personal interests to
86. The prospect of issuer liability counteracts any expected gain that managers or
other nonissuer actors would otherwise derivatively enjoy as a result of the issuer selling its
shares at an inflated price due to a disclosure violation.
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implement negative NPV projects in addition.87  The chance that their
share value-diminishing behavior is detected and stopped is lessened by
the very fact that firms with surplus internally generated funds do not
engage in outside finance.  Thus the real investment choices of their
managers are not subjected to the discipline and scrutiny of the market.88
Substantial empirical evidence indicates that the investment projects cho-
sen by firms relying predominantly on internal finance are considerably
inferior to projects chosen by other firms, an inefficiency that has signifi-
cantly damaged the economy’s growth in productivity.89
Since the late 1980s, hostile takeovers may have reduced the scale of
this problem. The high transaction costs associated with such takeovers,
87. I have argued elsewhere that to the extent that the managers of a management
controlled firm can do so without risk of a hostile takeover, it is in management’s best
interests to maximize the firm’s aggregate available cash flow (AACF), i.e., its aggregate
future earnings, before deductions for depreciation and management compensation and
expenses, discounted to present value at a rate reflecting management’s time preference
and risk aversion.  See Fox, Finance and Industrial Performance, supra note 54, at 121–27. R
The greater the AACF, the greater the capacity of the firm over time to satisfy the interests
of each of the top managers:  compensation, luxury perquisites, respect, power, affection
of those around him, and a sense of rectitude.  Striving to make AACF as large as possible
also implies, after deduction for management compensation and expenses, the largest
possible growth in firm assets (subject, of course, to the constraint that each project
invested in is not expected to actually lose money).  Id.  The idea that managers gain utility
simply from the size of the firm they run has a long history.  See, e.g., Robert A. Gordon,
Business Leadership in the Large Corporation passim (1945) (examining incentives of
managers to run large companies); Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit 291-312
(1921) (examining role of salaried corporate managers); Joseph A. Schumpeter, The
Theory of Economic Development 128–56 (Redvers Opie trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1949)
(1911) (discussing “entrepreneurial profit”).  Moreover, the greater the rate of growth of
the assets, the more opportunities for promotion, thereby improving the relations between
top managers and those directly below them.  See Oliver Williamson, Markets and
Hierarchies 120 (1975) (arguing that “dispute settling characteristics” lead to creation of
specialized roles).  The idea that managers of public corporations will under many
circumstances have an interest in investing in negative NPV projects is also behind Jensen’s
so-called “free cash flow” hypothesis.  See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash
Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 323, 323 (1986) (explaining
management incentives to grow firms beyond optimal size).
88. See Fox, Finance and Industrial Performance, supra note 54, at 132–40 R
(discussing management techniques for reading external scrutiny); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 650, 654 (1984) (noting
monitoring problem of managers who are not subject to outside scrutiny).
89. See, e.g., Gordon Donaldson, Corporate Debt Capacity 3–26 (1961) (introducing
analysis of “the choice between debt and equity as the source of . . . long-term capital”);
William J. Baumol et al., Earnings Retention, New Capital and the Growth of the Firm, 52
Rev. Econ. & Stat. 345, 354 (1970) (studying effect of source funding on investment
projects).  For a critical review of these and several other studies, along with an estimate of
the magnitude of the effects on the economy, see Fox, Finance and Industrial
Performance, supra note 54, at 233–37; see also Jensen, supra note 87, at 326–27 R
(reviewing empirical effects in oil industry); Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts
Seriously:  The Implications of “Discounted” Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 891, 898 (1988) (critiquing misinvestment and alternative discount
hypotheses).
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however, make this an expensive control device to the extent that other
less costly control devices are available, such as eliminating the current
liability system’s signal-blurring distortion of the financing choices of
firms that have less internally generated funds than positive NPV projects.
B. Increased Reliance on Alternative Sources of External Finance
Other ways for managers to provide investment project funds while
avoiding the heightened liability associated with a domestic public offer-
ing of equity involve raising the funds externally, but by some other
route.  Examples would be private placements of equity, sales of securities
the secondary trading of which will be confined to a market consisting of
large institutional investors (in the United States, Rule 144A),90 and pub-
lic offerings of equity restricted to foreign investors (in the United States,
Regulation S).91  To the extent that the distortion introduced by this
heightened liability leads to greater use of these forms of finance rather
than simply not funding positive NPV projects, there are again social
costs.  Securities sold pursuant to these vehicles have reduced liquidity
due to resale restrictions that are necessary to prevent the vehicles from
being used as conduits for unregulated domestic public offerings.  Re-
duced liquidity makes the securities less valuable to their purchasers and
so the proceeds such sales generate are discounted substantially.92  This
reduced liquidity creates the same kind of social welfare loss as the wel-
fare loss discussed above associated with illiquidity arising from lack of
disclosure.93  Greater use of nonpublic external finance also causes firms
to devote more legal and administrative resources to determining
whether a method of raising funds is in fact not a domestic public offer-
ing (and hence exempt from registration), as well as to determining
when and how the investors buying the securities can resell them.
Another alternative to a public offering of equity is a public offering
of debt.  A public debt offering must also be registered under the
90. A publicly traded U.S. issuer is not permitted, however, to use Rule 144A to avoid
Securities Act registration of an offering of its common stock.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A
(2008).
91. See id. §§ 230.901–.905.  Regulation S provides a safe harbor from registration of
foreign debt and equity offerings.  The conditions for falling within the safe harbor differ
depending on whether an issuer is foreign or domestic, whether it is registered under the
Exchange Act and providing Exchange Act periodic disclosure, and whether it is offering
debt or equity securities.
92. Studies attempting to separate the effects of resale restrictions from other factors
tending to discount the price of restricted stocks, such as the cost private investors incur to
assess the quality of the issuing firm and to monitor it, estimate the illiquidity discount to
be between seven percent and twenty percent.  Revisions to Rule 144 and Rule 145 to
Shorten Holding Period for Affiliates and Non-Affiliates, Securities Act Release No. 8813,
72 Fed. Reg. 36,822, 36,838 n.175 (proposed July 5, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
230, 239) (citing studies estimating illiquidity discount excluding other price-discounting
factors of restricted stocks).
93. See supra Part II.D.3.
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Securities Act94 and hence it too leads to heightened liability for nonis-
suer actors.  But a misstatement as to the assets of, or likely future under-
lying cash flows generated by, a firm at the time of a public debt offering
would, under many circumstances, be less likely to be considered material
than the same misstatement at a public equity offering.  Even if a mis-
statement does lead to liability, it would generally result in smaller dam-
ages.  Public debt offerings provide a lower chance of liability and smaller
potential damages because debt is paid back first in preference to distri-
butions to equity.  As a result, a misstatement will typically create a larger
misperception concerning the size of the residual available for distribu-
tions to equity than concerning the likelihood of the repayment of debt.
Thus heightened liability under existing U.S. law for nonissuer actors at
the time of the public offering of securities will create a managerial bias
toward choosing debt offerings over equity offerings.  Since this bias is
unrelated to the relative social costs of the choice, it creates an inefficient
distortion.  Because debt gives rise to agency costs, most financial econo-
mists believe that a firm has an optimal debt/equity ratio.95  This bias tilts
the firm toward exceeding this optimal ratio.  The resulting additional
agency costs are unnecessary social costs.
IV. THE PROPOSED CIVIL LIABILITY SYSTEM
Disclosure rules are meaningless without incentives for compliance.
Civil liability is one method of providing these incentives.  The starting
assumption of this Article is that a country has decided to have a set of
governmentally generated disclosure rules and to use civil liability as at
least one means to encourage compliance.  This assumption is a political
reality in the United States.  Mandatory disclosure backed by civil liability
is a well-established institution.  The existence of both a substantial body
of principled supporters and significant entrenched interests that pros-
per from its continued existence strongly suggests that the institution is
likely to endure in some form for a long time to come.  As outlined in
Part I, governments abroad are taking enforcement more seriously with
the growing concern for transparency.  Civil liability, whatever its
problems, has sufficient attractions that other countries are increasingly
likely to employ the remedy.
Parts II and III developed the principle that the system of civil liabil-
ity should be structured in such a way that corporate decisionmakers have
equally strong incentives for disclosure regulation compliance whether or
not the firm is publicly offering its equity.  This Part considers what such
a civil liability structure should look like.  The exercise helps us think
through the larger question of how to design a civil liability system that
94. Securities Act of 1933 § 5a, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006) (prohibiting sale of any
security without registration).
95. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. R
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reflects a modern understanding of financial economics and the role of
mandatory disclosure.
The proposal would provide incentives for compliance at all times
that are as strong as they traditionally were only at the times when an
issuer engaged in a U.S. Securities Act registered public offering.  The
key to the design, however, is not that the level of incentives chosen be
equal to that at the time of a traditional U.S. Securities Act registered
public offering; it is that whatever level of incentives is chosen, they be
equally strong at all times.  The choice of a level of strength equal to that
existing with a traditional Securities Act registered offering simply pro-
vides an illustrative baseline.  A different level could be easily achieved
with minor adjustments.
While there are clear social benefits to having the incentives for com-
pliance at the level in my proposal, there are obviously substantial social
costs as well, including significant resources devoted to both due dili-
gence and litigation.  For the United States, a cost-benefit analysis might
suggest that the level of incentive strength should be lower or higher than
the baseline example used here.  Even if the level suggested here is right
for the United States, a cost-benefit analysis might indicate a different
level of incentive strength for another country.96
96. The ownership pattern of the typical publicly traded corporation in the United
States is dispersed, with no single controlling shareholder.  Raphael La Porta et al.,
Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. Fin. 471, 491–94 (1999) (noting that “16
out of 20 [firms] in the United States fit the widely held description”).  With such a
corporation, the primary corporate governance problem is the divergence of interests
between management and shareholders, i.e., the agency costs of management.  See supra
note 40 and accompanying text.  As discussed, disclosure can ameliorate this problem. R
Supra note 40 and accompanying text. R
In a substantial majority of other countries, most corporations are controlled by
families or the state. La Porta et al., supra, at 496 (“[O]nly 24 percent of the large
companies in rich countries are widely held, compared to 35 percent that are family-
controlled, [and] 20 percent are State-controlled . . . .”).  As a consequence, the corporate
governance problems differ from those in the United States.  These differences may affect
disclosure’s usefulness for improving corporate governance and hence disclosure’s level of
social benefits.  Coffee, Gatekeepers, supra note 19, at 78–82 (explaining that dispersed R
ownership creates managerial incentives to exaggerate reported income whereas
concentrated ownership tends to lead to extraction of private benefits of control); John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership:  The Roles of Law and the State in the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1, 16–17 (2001) (discussing dispersed
versus concentrated ownership).  If, because of these corporate governance differences,
the social benefits from disclosure in such a country are less, then the optimal level of
incentives for compliance would likely be less as well, because providing stronger
incentives tends to be more socially costly.  Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra
note 37, at 2580 (detailing optimal apportionment of regulatory authority). R
But comparing the social benefits from disclosure in different countries is tricky.  On
one hand, the agency problems associated with management are lower in countries where
most corporations are controlled by families or banks because persons with control can
supervise managers more easily than can dispersed shareholders.  Thus a high level of
disclosure is not as necessary to keep managers in line.  On the other hand, the persons
with control may, at the expense of the noncontrol shareholders, seek to maximize their
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A. Substantive Rules Governing the Disclosure Process
1. Timing. — The liability scheme proposed here contemplates that
issuers are required to provide periodic disclosure.  The U.S. system, with
its extensive annual report on Form 10-K, its quarterly updates of a se-
lected subset of disclosures on Form 10-Q, and its “current report” for
major new developments on Form 8-K, is an example of a system with
such requirements.  In addition, any time an issuer offers to sell a sub-
stantial number of additional securities, it would need to disclose any ma-
terial changes since its last annual report that are not disclosed in a subse-
quent quarterly or current report.97  Under this scheme, the price of the
own private benefits or those of nonshareholder stakeholders of the corporation, such as
labor or the communities where the corporation is located.  Disclosure can be helpful in
discouraging such behavior, but the extent of its effectiveness depends greatly on the
specific situation.  News of such behavior may depress share prices, but if those in control
directly or indirectly determine the votes of a majority of the shares, such a decrease in
price will not lead to a fear of being replaced by a hostile takeover.  Whether disclosure has
some other kind of deterring effect depends both on the overall social and business mores
of the country and the extent to which such behavior can be meaningfully challenged in
court.  Also, to the extent that the share value-depressing behavior involves decisions that
benefit other stakeholders at the expense of shareholders, there is a debate as to whether
such behavior is socially undesirable in the first place.  While a broad, though not
universal, consensus exists among commentators in the United States that share value-
diminishing decisions are generally socially undesirable, this view is far from fully accepted
abroad.  Compare Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 453–56 (2007), and
Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 2, 130–31 (1993) (describing
objective of American corporate law as maximization of share value and criticizing other
systems that take other constituencies into account), with Michael Gruson & Wienand
Meilicke, The New Co-Determination Law in Germany, 32 Bus. Law. 571, 571–73 (1977),
and Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the “Modern” Corporation:  Perspectives from the
German, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 23, 38–43 (1966) (describing corporate purpose of German
corporations as extending beyond maximizing shareholder value).
97. Without such an updating requirement, issuers will have an incentive to offer
securities immediately after they become aware of bad news and before they would be
required to disclose it in their periodic reports.  Such an updating requirement is included
in the automatic shelf registration procedure that was introduced as part of the SEC’s 2005
offering reforms and that brings the United States closer to a company registration-type
mandatory disclosure regime for large established issuers (WKSIs).  See supra note 11. R
The updating works as follows:  Issuers filing an automatic shelf registration statement may
incorporate by reference all reports filed under the Exchange Act.  See Registration
Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-3), at 11–12 (2008).  At the time of
registration, the issuer need describe only “material changes” since its most recent
Exchange Act filing, either by describing these material changes directly in its Form S-3
automatic shelf registration statement or by describing them in a Form 8-K that the issuer
then files and incorporates by reference in the Form S-3.  See id.  After the effective date of
the registration statement, Item 512(a) of Regulation S-K requires the issuer, during any
period when an offering is actually being made, to file a post-effective amendment to
reflect any facts or events that represent a “fundamental change” in the information set
forth in the registration statement.  See 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(a)(1) (2008).
Additional updating at the time of the offering should probably be waived if the issuer
is making a de minimis offering or offerings—such as, say, an offering in aggregate less
than a few percent of its shares within a three-month period.  The waiver is appropriate
because the gain the issuer could achieve by selling the shares at a possibly higher price
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issuer’s shares in the secondary market will, assuming compliance, reflect
up-to-date information concerning every subject of the mandatory disclo-
sure rules.  This secondary market price will be the main determinant of
the price at which the new primary market offering would be made since
the newly offered shares and the already outstanding ones are perfect
substitutes for each other.98
because of bad news that it is not yet required to disclose under the periodic disclosure
regime is not sufficiently large, given the relatively small number of shares offered, to
create a special incentive to make an offering.  Freeing such small offerings from the
updating requirement would facilitate a “just in time” method of “at the market” equity
financing.  Facilitating such offerings is desirable because by not requiring the real
resources that would otherwise go into marketing, they involve lower social costs.  The
2005 offering reforms do not provide this kind of a waiver.  See supra note 11 (discussing R
2005 offering reforms).
At the other extreme, if an offering is sufficiently large—perhaps equal to thirty or
forty percent of outstanding equity—the disclosure and liability regime proposed here
should not be applicable.  See supra note 11.  For two reasons, the issuer should instead be R
treated in the same fashion as an IPO.  First, an offering of this size is likely to accompany a
transformative event in the history of the firm, and so the efficiency of the secondary
market price before the offering provides much less assurance that the offering price will
be efficient.  Second, as with an IPO, significant marketing efforts will be necessary to find
new persons willing to hold the many new shares being offered, and so again an efficient
secondary market in the issuer’s shares provides less assurance that the offering price is
efficient.  The 2005 offering reform’s amended Rule 415, however, places no limit on the
number of securities that may be offered by a WKSI pursuant to its automatic shelf
procedure.  See supra note 11. R
98. This is not to say that the price of the offering will necessarily be the same as it
would have been in the secondary market if the new primary market offering had not been
made.  In fact, there are a number of reasons, discussed below, why the decision by an
established issuer to raise cash through a new primary market offering might affect the
secondary market price of the issuer’s shares.  The important point for this discussion,
however, is that none of these reasons undermines the company registration logic of
relying on secondary market prices to assure that the price of the primary offering reflects
up-to-date information.
One reason the decision to offer the securities could affect the secondary price is
signaling.  Even with mandatory disclosure, managers inevitably know more than outsiders,
and outsiders may assume that the decision to offer equity means that managers, based on
their private information, think the stock is worth less than its secondary market price.
The announcement of the offering will therefore cause the price to drop.  Brealey, Myers
& Allen, supra note 9, at 490–93 (observing that rational investors will believe “[t]he R
attempt to sell stock shows that it must be worth less”); Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S.
Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that
Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. Fin. Econ. 187, 188 (1984) (noting that investors will reason
that “[t]he news conveyed by an issue is bad”).  Presumably, though, the better the
periodic mandatory disclosure regime, the smaller the signaling effect.
The second and third reason offering the securities could affect the secondary market
price both relate to the increased supply of the issuer’s shares.  The increased supply of
shares could create a long-run or only short-run effect.  The possible long-run effect relates
to the much debated question of whether there is a downward sloping demand curve for
each individual issuer’s shares.  The capital asset pricing model would suggest that there is
not because a vast reservoir of other stocks with the same beta could substitute for the
issuer’s shares.  Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 570 n.67 (1984).  For empirical findings purporting to
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2. External Certification. — The annual report, in addition to being
signed by the top executives and a majority of directors, would be signed
by a certifying, financially sound investment bank or other well-capital-
ized entity with financial expertise (the “external certifier”).  At the same
time, the external certifier would also certify, subject to any corrections
set out in the annual report, the truthfulness of all the issuer’s other SEC
filings during the preceding year as of their respective filing dates.  The
certifier would thus associate itself with the annual report in the same way
as would an underwriter in a traditional registered offering.  As described
infra Part IV.C, the external certifier, in order to maintain a defense to
liability if any of these filings contained a material misstatement, would
need to conduct the same kind of due diligence investigation concerning
the truthfulness and completeness of the annual report and the earlier
filings as an investment bank traditionally conducted as an underwriter in
a registered public offering.  In return for providing this gatekeeping
function, the certifier would obviously charge a fee.  The object of impos-
ing liability coupled with a due diligence defense is to motivate the exter-
nal certifier to assure that the annual report would contain the same high
quality of disclosure as traditional U.S. registration statements in a public
offering typically did.99  The prospect that the earlier filings would need
support this theory, see Myron S. Scholes, The Market for Securities:  Substitution Versus
Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179, 191–206
(1972).  But see Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Equity Issuers and Offering Dilution, 15
J. Fin. Econ. 61, 70–85 (1986) (presenting empirical research purporting to show
downward-sloping curve); Saul Levmore, Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70
Va. L. Rev. 645, 653–54 (1984) (reviewing alternative explanations for Scholes’s findings).
Alternatively, the increased supply might have only a temporary effect on the
secondary market price if investors would need to adjust their portfolios for the new supply
to be absorbed by the market.  These adjustments entail transaction costs that must be
compensated for by a decrease in price.  Once the absorption occurs, however, price
should return to the level dictated by fundamentals.  Michael J. Barclay & Robert H.
Litzenberger, Announcement Effects of New Equity Issues and the Use of Intraday Price
Data, 21 J. Fin. Econ. 71, 97 (1988) (summarizing empirical findings purportedly
consistent with this theory).
99. See supra notes 5, 10, 11 (discussing traditional role played by underwriters in R
enhancing quality of disclosure at time of securities offering and how movement toward
company registration, with its greatly reduced time to bring an offering to market, has
undermined this function); see also Coffee, Gatekeepers, supra note 19, at 206, 348–49 R
(discussing attorneys’ traditional gatekeeping role); Coffee, Re-Engineering, supra note
11, at 1157 (same); David J. Denis, Shelf Registration and the Market for Seasoned Equity R
Offerings, 64 J. Bus. 189, 197–98 (1991) (discussing price of underwriting under shelf
procedure).  For a description of the traditional registration statement’s more leisurely
drafting processes, which involved the active participation of the underwriters and their
counsel, and citations to a variety of commentators who stated that this process generated
significant additional disclosure beyond what was in an issuer’s periodic filings, see Fox,
Shelf Registration, supra note 12, at 1025–26.  An external certifier certifying an issuer’s R
annual report would have as much time as the underwriter had in a traditional offering
and so could play a similar role.  Because the external certifier would face the same liability
as the underwriter in the traditional offering, it would be motivated to perform this role
similarly well.
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subsequent certification or correction by the external certifier would pro-
vide an incentive for the issuer and its officers and directors to make
them accurate as well.
Investment banks are unusually well situated to play this vital gate-
keeper role.  To start, unlike lawyers or accountants, their skill set in-
cludes projecting future cash flows.  Modern U.S. mandatory disclosure
involves much more than providing accounting numbers that relate to
past performance.  Particularly important is the Management’s
Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”), in which the issuer must disclose any
trends or uncertainties known to management that could result in past
earnings being not necessarily indicative of future earnings.100  Informa-
tion useful for projecting future cash flows is the information most useful
to persons trading in the market and their advisers.  Analysts and specula-
tive traders strive to make their projections of an issuer’s cash flow as
accurate as possible.  This is because future cash flows determine share
value and it serves their personal interests to identify issuers whose share
values are above or below current market price.  For the reasons dis-
cussed in Part II, trading behavior based on more accurate projections, by
moving share price toward share value, promotes societal interests as well.
To the extent that the revisions of the annual report instead require legal
or accounting expertise, investment banks are well positioned to take re-
sponsibility for delegating such work.
Investment banks also have experience because they currently per-
form this same role in connection with IPOs.  This experience not only
means that they are prepared to perform this task well, but also suggests
that they would be interested in providing certifications as a way to ex-
tract additional rents from an already established skill set.101
Finally, investment banks have the virtue of being highly capitalized,
minimizing the chance that the prospect of being made judgment proof
will compromise their motivation to provide needed due diligence.
Other kinds of entities with a staff of persons with high financial ex-
pertise, such as major consulting firms, could also perform this certifying
role well.  Although they would not start with the advantages of an organi-
zation that is already performing the same task in the context of IPOs,
they would not be at any cost disadvantage as they gained experience.  It
is in fact desirable to open the opportunity of being an external certifier
100. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303.  There is empirical evidence that the late-1970s
adoption of the revisions to the MD&A that prompted these disclosures resulted in a
significant improvement in share price accuracy.  See Fox et al., Share Price Accuracy,
supra note 39, at 376. R
101. Investment banks are currently oriented primarily toward selling financial
products, trading on their own accounts, and arranging transactions.  This orientation
might suggest an organizational disinclination to developing a certification business,
despite the synergies involved.  There are other areas, however, where investment banks
have chosen to exploit existing skills for new, nonsales applications—for example the
provision of “fairness opinions” in corporate control and financial restructuring
transactions.
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as broadly as possible, consistent with maintaining quality and adequate
capitalization, because competition will keep prices down and encourage
efficiency and innovation.  It would be necessary, however, for the SEC or
its equivalent abroad to approve entities to be external certifiers so as to
assure their financial capacity to pay liabilities and their competency to
do the job.102
B. Issuer Liability
1. A Disclosure Violation with No Offer of Securities. — This Article’s pro-
posal, unlike U.S. law today, would not hold the issuer liable for civil dam-
ages if it commits a disclosure violation but offers no securities.  This
eliminates Rule 10b-5 fraud-on-the-market suits against issuers based on
their misstatements in mandatory disclosure filings.  Liability for issuer
statements made outside issuer filings would also be eliminated if substan-
tially the same statement were previously or simultaneously made in a
filing.  The object of such a rule would be to funnel all significant state-
ments through the official filing process and thus subject them to the
truth-inducing effects of the external certification and of the prospect of
liability outlined below for the relevant nonissuer actors.  Should the
statement made outside the filing be false, the damage would have al-
ready been done when it appeared in the filing.  No further damage oc-
curs from the simultaneous or subsequent retelling unless the retelling
appears to have an updating quality.
Freeing the issuer from liability but maintaining liability for other
actors may at first glance seem backward.  A corporate entity, the issuer, is
the entity required to produce the disclosures.  The standard law and eco-
nomics wisdom is that if civil liability for a corporate violation exists, the
corporate entity should be primarily liable.103  According to this view, the
open question would be whether the law should impose secondary liabil-
ity on the issuer’s directors, officers, and professional agents, with the
102. Established major investment banks are highly capitalized because that is what is
needed to perform their ordinary range of businesses.  A survey of banks with major
investment banking and underwriting operations—J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, UBS,
Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, and Morgan Stanley—revealed that as of January
26, 2009, their total stock market capitalization ranged, respectively, from about $90 billion
to $18 billion.  Their latest reported total book equity ranged, in minor variation from this
respective order, from about $147 billion to $28 billion.  These figures were reflected in
the data at Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com, on January 26, 2009.  Copies of
each relevant page are on file with the Columbia Law Review.
To prevent the entry of poorly capitalized “fly by night” investment banks or other
entities into the certification business, the SEC or its equivalent abroad would, like a state
insurance examiner, need to maintain some kind of supervision to assure the capital
adequacy of the entities whose certifications it would accept, as well as their competency to
perform due diligence.
103. Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 Yale L.J. 857, 858 (1984).
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presumption being that it should not absent a showing that issuer liability
alone will fail.104
But this conventional wisdom does not fit disclosure violations very
well.  When managers of a corporation make decisions that result in the
corporation’s violation of the typical regulation—for example a rule lim-
iting the emission of toxic pollutants—the victims are third parties.  In
contrast, when the managers make decisions that result in the corpora-
tion’s violation of a disclosure rule, the corporation is the primary victim
of the violation, just as it is the party hurt by a director or officer’s breach
of a fiduciary duty.  This is because, as demonstrated in Part II, disclo-
sure’s primary role is to improve corporate governance105 and to lower
the corporation’s cost of capital by increasing the expected level of liquid-
ity.106  The corporation’s shareholders are thus the persons ultimately
damaged by the violation because poor management and reduced liquid-
ity reduce the value of shares.
What, though, about the persons who purchased or sold in the sec-
ondary market at an unfavorable price during the period of the violation?
Are they not victims?  The answer is no.  When the issuer is not offering
securities, buyers and sellers in the secondary market are, in terms of the
prices that they pay or receive, no better off on an expected basis with a
disclosure regulation-compliant corporation than with a noncompliant
one.  If a falsely positive disclosure violation increases an issuer’s share
price by five dollars, every buyer pays five dollars more per share than if
there had been no violation.  But every seller receives five dollars more
per share.  For every share traded, the buyer’s loss because of the viola-
tion is exactly counterbalanced by the seller’s gain.  More generally, the
overall effect of a disclosure violation on investors trading in the secon-
dary market is a zero-sum game:  The winners’ winnings just equal the
losers’ losses.  Each winner and loser is in that position by reason of
chance and is just as likely to be in the opposite position as the result of
disclosure violations by other issuers.  For the typical diversified investor,
and even for the nondiversified investor who buys and sells different
stocks over time, her aggregate experience with disclosure violations is
likely to be a wash.
If the losers have a cause of action against the issuer, it will ultimately
be paid for by the shareholders at the time the suit is brought, thereby
passing on the losses from one chance group to another, neither of which
should be any less able to bear the risk than the other, at least for any
diversified investor within either group.107  As has been widely recognized
104. Id. at 867–68; see also Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accidents 170–72
(1987).
105. See supra Part II.B.
106. See supra Part II.D.
107. Between an undiversified loser and an undiversified shareholder at the time suit
is brought, a damage action would probably permit some loss spreading.  At the time suit is
brought, some of the issuer’s shareholders have held their shares since before the issuer’s
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for some time, this means that under a regime by which the losers are
compensated by issuers that make the false statements, the damages are
in some sense “circular.”108
In sum, as critics of fraud-on-the-market class action suits have ar-
gued, the compensation justification for a cause of action against the is-
suer for a misstatement in a disclosure filing is very weak, particularly
given the high transaction costs associated with securities litigation.  Such
a cause of action does have deterrence value, however.  Managers will be
motivated to avoid disclosure violations in order to avoid the issuer losses
involved in paying damages, just as they are motivated to avoid any other
large cost to the firm.  But, as developed in Part IV.E infra, the same level
of deterrence can be achieved more effectively and at less cost by impos-
ing liability on the managers directly.109
misstatement and so suffered no trading loss as a result because they neither bought nor
sold at a price influenced by the misstatement.  Thus, not all of the issuer’s shares were
traded at a disadvantageous price due to the misstatement.  As a result, providing damages
will spread the losses from the persons who did engage in such disadvantageous trades
across the holders of all the outstanding shares, which is larger in number than the
number of shares traded at a disadvantageous price.  But this loss spreading comes at the
very high price of the substantial real resources consumed by securities litigation.  See
supra note 18 and accompanying text.  Diversification offers a more effective, and far less R
expensive, way to reduce the risks associated with issuer misstatements.  Thus risk
reduction is an unconvincing rationale for imposing civil liability on issuers in order to
provide damages to those who lose by trading at disadvantageous prices due to issuer
misstatements.
108. For authors expressing skepticism toward the compensation rationale for civil
liability imposed on issuers to provide damages to those who trade in the secondary market
at disadvantageous prices due to issuer misstatements, see, e.g., Coffee, Reforming, supra
note 18, at 1556–66; Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in R
Impersonal Markets, 78 Va. L. Rev. 623, 632 (1992); Thakor, Unintended Consequences,
supra note 20, at 6–8. R
109. Professors Arlen and Carney reach the same conclusion. They analyze the
problem in terms of the three traditional rationales in the accident law context for
favoring enterprise liability over agent liability:  Enterprise liability deters more effectively,
better spreads risk between the firm and its agents, and better allocates losses between the
firm and the victims of the violation.  They find that none of these rationales apply
persuasively in the case of fraud-on-the-market violations of securities law.  Jennifer H.
Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets:  Theory and
Evidence, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 691, 700–20.  While my reasoning and theirs overlap a great
deal, our analyses differ in one important respect.  They do not identify that from the
appropriate ex ante perspective, secondary market investors are not damaged in terms of
their trading profits by the prospect of buying and selling shares of corporations that
engage in frequent misstatements rather than few or none.  See supra Part IV.B.1.
Recognizing this fact makes crystal clear that the only kind of damage, if any, that should
give rise to liability is damage to the corporation itself.  See supra note 88 and R
accompanying text.  This insight saves steps in the analysis and eliminates the need for
unrealistic assumptions, such as that there is no possibility of overdeterrence in the case of
misstatements.  See supra Part II.B–D.  Given, for example, the possibility of legal error
and the discretion that management has in fully answering questions required by its
periodic disclosure filings (to say nothing of voluntary disclosure beyond the requirements
of these filings), we need to recognize that the risk of liability can deter management from
making what it believes is truthful disclosure.  See infra Part IV.C.1.  Similarly, through the
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2. A Disclosure Violation When Securities Are Being Offered Publicly. —
The issuer’s public offer of securities at the time a disclosure violation
exists should, as under U.S. law today, make the issuer absolutely liable to
investors.110  The aggregate amount of issuer liability should be equal to
the increase in the issuer’s sale price resulting from the violation multi-
plied by the number of the shares sold.
Imposing liability on the issuer for a disclosure violation when the
issuer offers securities and not otherwise may seem contradictory as part
of a liability scheme intended to provide corporate decisionmakers with
equally strong incentives for regulatory compliance whether or not the
issuer is selling securities.  Such issuer liability when the issuer is offering
its equities for sale, however, simply returns what would otherwise be the
special gain for committing a price-inflating disclosure violation.  Thus,
issuer liability does not create an incentive for managers and directors to
provide higher than usual compliance at the time of such a sale; it is an
antidote for what would otherwise be an incentive to provide lower than
usual compliance.  This incentive for lower than usual compliance arises
because of the derivative gains that such corporate decisionmakers enjoy
when an issuer does better financially, which will happen if it sells shares
for more than they are worth.
Exactly to whom this aggregate amount of liability should run is a
complicated question.  The prospect of this liability will be equally effec-
level of care required to maintain a due diligence defense available to directors, officers,
and the external certifier, we can affect the level of care that an issuer devotes to the
accuracy of its disclosures.  This care is costly and so there is some optimal level above
which the care becomes socially wasteful.  See supra note 96; infra Part IV.C.1. R
110. In this context, the term “absolute liability” sounds more draconian than it really
is.  To give rise to liability, a statement of historical fact must be false or misleading at the
time it is made.  See, e.g., In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 742–43 (8th Cir.
2002) (stating plaintiff’s complaint fails under heightened pleading standard of Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) because it did not indicate why defendant’s
statements would have been false or misleading at time they were made).  This suggests
that whatever the state of mind of the issuer’s agents, the true state of affairs must be
knowable at the time, something that the plaintiff would have to show to establish falsity.
Id.  With respect to a forward-looking statement, which by definition cannot be a statement
of fact, calling it “false” or “misleading” has to go to how reasonable a basis the forward
looking statement has and the issuer’s degree of conviction as to its accuracy.  The
specification of what constitutes an actionable forward-looking statement under U.S.
securities law has undergone considerable development over the last forty years.  The
current law on actionable forward-looking statements comprises a mix of statutory and
common law rules.  Rule 175 and Rule 3b-6, promulgated under the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act, respectively, provide a safe harbor for projections made with a reasonable
basis and in good faith.  Pub. L. No. 104-67, §§ 27A(g), 21E(g), 109 Stat. 737, 751–755
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (2006)).  For reporting issuers, the PSLRA amended
the Securities Act and Exchange Act to provide additional safe harbors for certain
projections.  Id.  Courts have also developed the “bespeaks caution doctrine,” which
protects projections if accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements.  See, e.g.,
Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 879 (1st Cir. 1991) (“Documents such
as this, which, ‘clearly “bespeak caution,”’ are not the stuff of which securities fraud claims
are made.” (quoting Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1986))).
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tive in deterring disclosure violations whether liability runs to the inves-
tors or someone else—the government, for example.  Also, it is arguably
not necessary from a fairness point of view for the payments to go to
investors.  If liability were imposed, but the proceeds went elsewhere and
so compensation were not paid to the purchasers, the market price of all
firms that offer securities would be discounted to reflect deterrence’s fail-
ure in a certain percentage of cases, with the resulting disclosure viola-
tions making the issuers involved look more valuable than they really are.
So, even without the prospect of compensation, the price is fair ex ante,
even though some investors will be unlucky and suffer a loss ex post.
Paying investors the damages collected from issuers may matter, how-
ever, for allocative efficiency, if the “institutional” view of finance is cor-
rect so that share price directly affects established firm real investment.111
Without the prospect of compensation, investors will discount what they
are willing to pay for the shares of all issuers that offer securities because
they cannot identify the issuers for which deterrence will fail.  Consider
the honest issuers that in the ideal world, with no misstatements and
hence no discount, would have received a high enough price for their
shares to find equity financing worthwhile.  With the discount, equity fi-
nance will no longer be worthwhile for some and positive NPV projects
will not be implemented.  Full compensation would eliminate the dis-
count and so assure implementation of these projects.112  Moreover, pro-
viding a purchaser with a right to compensation creates a pool of inter-
ested private persons on whose behalf the civil suits, necessary for liability
to serve its deterrence function, can be brought.
The total damages paid by the issuer should, as noted, equal the
number of shares that it sells in the offering multiplied by the amount by
which the disclosure violation inflated the price at which the shares were
sold.  The total damages collected should presumably be divided among
all persons who purchased the issuer’s shares during the period that their
price was inflated by the misstatement, whether they purchased in the
primary market at the start of the offering or later in the secondary mar-
ket.  For purchases in the secondary market, it should not matter whether
the share purchased was one sold in the primary offering or one that was
already outstanding.  The total damages paid by the issuer should be di-
vided among these claimants pro rata, for each investor for each share
that she purchased during this period, to the amount by which the price
was inflated by the misstatement at the time of purchase (less, if it were
sold prior to the bringing of the suit, the amount, if any, it was still in-
flated at the time of sale).113
111. See supra Part II.C.2.
112. The allocative efficiency effects of compensating investors are not free from
ambiguity, however.  With the discount being eliminated by compensation, more issuers
that are making misstatements may also find it worthwhile to make offerings.
113. Each of the two alternative approaches to compensation creates serious
problems.  One approach allows secondary market purchasers to sue, but only if they
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C. Liability of Other Actors
Whether or not a securities offering is occurring, a disclosure viola-
tion should trigger imposition of liability on the directors, officers, and
external certifier.  These actors’ liability would be absolute, subject to a
due diligence defense, which is the current U.S. rule only when the issuer
is offering securities.  Damages should be in a limited amount and unre-
lated to whether there is an offering.  The damages should be payable to
the issuer, not to investors who engaged in losing trades as a result of the
misstatement.
1. The Object of Placing Liability on the Nonissuer Actor. — The object of
the proposed liability system is to give the directors, officers, and, most
importantly, the external certifier the same civil liability incentives to
make an established issuer comply with its periodic disclosure require-
ments as the incentives that used to exist (and still exist in the case of an
IPO) to make the issuer comply with the Securities Act registration state-
ment disclosure requirements for a public offering.114  These incentives
worked well in the past to produce high-quality disclosure, before short
form and shelf registration made serious underwriter due diligence for
offerings by established issuers impractical.115  Each of these nonissuer
actors will be exposed to the same risk of liability, in roughly comparable
amounts, as they would have faced in a traditional registered offering,
and each will be provided with the same due diligence defense.116  With
such incentives in place, established issuers can be expected to provide
on an ongoing basis the same high level of disclosure that they provided
in a previous era, when they were engaging in public offerings.117
purchased the specific shares originally sold in the offering.  Secondary market purchaser
compensation would be largely a chimera because, as a practical matter, in this market the
shares from the offering are usually indistinguishable from those that were already
outstanding.  Even if the distinction could be made, it would be incompatible with a single
secondary market for the issuer’s shares because each type would have different rights and
hence a different value.  The alternative approach is to confine the cause of action only to
primary market purchasers.  This reduces the liquidity of the offered securities because
they would lose their rights to damages when sold and hence, all else being equal, be worth
less to the purchaser than to the seller.
114. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. 77(k); see also supra Part I.A.2.
115. See supra notes 7, 11–12, 99 and accompanying text. R
116. Greater accuracy in firm disclosures requires a greater level of care by the firm’s
officers, directors, and external certifier.  Greater care involves greater costs.  Therefore,
there is some optimal level of care.  As discussed at the beginning of Part IV, this proposal
assumes that the optimal level of care is what was required in the traditional registered
public offering.  See supra Part IV.A.  If analysis for either the United States or another
country suggests that a different level of care is optimal, then the level of care required of
the officers, directors, and certifying investment bank, in order that each can maintain its
due diligence defense, should be adjusted accordingly.
117. This Article does not deal specifically with the liability of accountants for
misstatements in the audited financials contained in the annual report.  Accountants are
obviously vital gatekeepers.  They too will have greater incentives to exercise care if subject
to some kind of civil liability.  It may be appropriate to subject accountants to an approach
similar to what is recommended here for other nonissuer defendants, freeing them from
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2. The Nonissuer Actor’s Liabilities as Their Contribution Obligations to
“Total Liability.”
a. Certification by the External Certifier and Directors and Officers. — The
external certifier and the directors and top officers of the issuer would
each sign the issuer’s periodic disclosure annual report filing (the 10-K in
the U.S. system).  The signature would constitute a certification of the
truthfulness of the annual report and of each of the issuer’s periodic dis-
closure filings during the preceding year (except to the extent that any
misstatement in the earlier filing was properly corrected in the annual
report).
b. The Concept of “Total Liability.” — The concept of Total Liability is
the starting point for calculating the amount of liability for each nonis-
suer actor if the annual report contains a disclosure violation and the
actor does not meet its due diligence defense.  To determine Total
Liability, treat the annual report as if it were a registration statement for a
share offering in an amount, call it I, equal to the issuer’s total amount of
real investment and increase in nonliquid assets during the preceding
year.  The phantom number of shares offered in this hypothetical offer-
ing would be I/P, where P is the issuer’s share price immediately after the
filing.  The Total Liability would be the amount by which the share price
was increased as a result of the disclosure violation times I/P (the phan-
tom number of shares in the hypothetical offering).118
fraud-on-the-market liability and substituting some other kind of measured liability that
depends in part on the size of the issuer’s annual investment rather than on trading
volume during the period of the misstatement.  But the issues relating to the tradeoffs
between achieving any given level of care and the costs of doing so, as well as the history of
the applicable rules of liability to date, are sufficiently different that they call for a separate
inquiry.
118. For each phantom share offered, this measure is roughly equivalent to the
aggregate amount of damages owed under section 11(e) of the Securities Act to the one or
more purchasers of the share in the period between the time of the offering and the time
suit is brought.  Under section 11(e), subject to certain caps, the person holding this share
at the time suit is brought has a prima facie case for damages equal to the difference
between the price he paid and its “value” at the time of suit.  Securities Act of 1933 § 11(e),
15 U.S.C. § 77k(e).  Value, in the case of an established issuer trading in an efficient
market, is typically the price at time of suit.  See In re Fortune Sys. Sec. Litig., 680 F. Supp.
1360, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (“The ‘value’ of a security may be found to be different from
the actual price . . . , but this is an unusual and rare situation.  In general, price and value
are used interchangeably, and the courts have not often found the ‘true value’ of a stock to
differ from its market value.”).  If this holder purchased the share in the secondary market
rather than in the offering itself so that the share had one or more prior holders, each
prior holder’s prima facie case for damages equals the difference between price paid and
price sold.  Thus, except to the extent that certain caps alter the calculation, the potential
aggregate prima facie case for damages associated with each share in the offering is the
difference between the offering price and the price at the time suit is brought.  Section
11(e) allows the defendant an affirmative defense to the extent that it can show that the
decline was caused by something besides the misstatement.  § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e).
Each secondary market purchaser must also show that the share purchased was one sold in
the offering.  See Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 871–73 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[A]ll
four courts of appeals to address the question have held that . . . aftermarket purchasers
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c. Liability of Each Nonissuer Actor. — Each nonissuer actor’s individ-
ual potential liability would be the amount the actor would be required
under U.S. law to pay in an action against it for contribution, if, as de-
scribed above, the annual report were a registration statement for an of-
fering of I dollars in shares (with the external certifier being the under-
writer) and the Total Liability had been paid in full by some other
defendant who then brings the contribution action against the actor in
question.  If a suit should arise after the disclosure filing, each actor can
free herself of this potential liability by engaging in acts that would enable
her to show that at the time of the filing, after reasonable investigation,
she had reason to believe and did believe the annual report contained no
disclosure violations.  Thus each actor would have the same incentive to
make the issuer’s annual report disclosure violation free as she tradition-
ally had with respect to an issuer’s Securities Act registration statement.
d. Interim Reports. — If any of the issuer’s quarterly or other updating
filings (in the U.S. system, 10-Qs and 8-Ks) contained a material misstate-
ment that was not corrected in the annual report, each of the nonissuer
actors would be liable as if the misstatement had been repeated in the
annual report.  If it was corrected in the annual report, the external certi-
fier would not be liable.  Each officer and director in office at the time of
the earlier filing would be liable, but damages would be reduced so that
they would be in proportion to the fraction of the year between the date
of the earlier filing and the date of the annual report (or, if unambigu-
ously corrected earlier, the date of the earlier correction).
e. Underwriter Liability Eliminated. — Unlike under U.S. law today, no
liability would be imposed on any underwriter associated with a public
offering for any disclosure violation relating to the issuer involved.119
Under the proposal, the underwriter’s traditional information forcing
function would be taken over by the external certifier.
f. Varying the Level of Damage Exposure. — There is nothing sacred
about the specific levels of damage exposure traditionally imposed under
the Securities Act on the underwriting investment bank or the other
nonissuer actors associated with a public offering.  Indeed, these levels
have themselves been somewhat in flux over time.  As part of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), for example, the Securities
have standing to sue under § 11.”); see also Gibb v. Delta Drilling Co., 104 F.R.D. 59, 69–70
(N.D. Tex. 1984) (“To recover under Section 11 a party need only show that he purchased
securities that are the direct subject of the prospectus and registration statement.”).
119. This refers to underwriter liability akin to existing liability for false or misleading
statements in the registration statement pursuant to section 11 of the 1933 Act.  See § 11,
15 U.S.C. § 77(k).  The underwriter should still be liable to purchasers in the offering for
its own statements pursuant to a Rule 10b-5 antifraud standard.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2008).  If the external certifier were also the investment bank that was acting as the
underwriter, it would, of course, be liable as the external certifier just as if it were not the
underwriter.
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Act was amended in 1995 to reduce the exposure of outside directors.120
A cost-benefit analysis might suggest the desirability of further tinkering
with respect to some or all kinds of nonissuer defendants who are individ-
uals, for example imposing income- or wealth-based damage caps.  Nor is
there anything sacred about the current standards of what constitutes due
diligence with respect to any of the nonissuer defendants.  Again, a cost-
benefit analysis might suggest that safe harbors be available to certain
classes of nonissuer defendants such as outside directors, if, for example,
they undertake specified procedures such as reasonable reliance on
outside disclosure counsel.121  The key point is that each of these nonis-
suer defendants faces some diminishment in wealth if the annual report
contains a material misstatement unless it can establish a due diligence
defense appropriately designed to reflect what would likely be discovered
from a reasonable investigation for a person in that actor’s position.122
g. Indemnification and Insurance. — Indemnifying nonissuer actors, at
least beyond perhaps paying officer and director legal fees, would make
no sense because the damages are being paid to the issuer and so it would
just be taking money out of one pocket and putting it back in the other.
120. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 201, 109
Stat. 737, 758–62 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(f), 78u-4(f)) (amending
section 11(f) of Securities Act to limit liability of outside directors to proportionate
liability, except in case of a knowing violation, to which joint and several liability would still
attach).
121. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform:  The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 301, 355 (2004) (arguing that in order to
relieve tension between lawyer as gatekeeper and lawyer as advocate, corporations should
use two separate law firms, with one acting as outside disclosure counsel, where disclosure
counsel would review issuer’s filings).  With this sort of procedure, if the disclosure
counsel’s opinion stated that no information had come to its attention that would suggest
any disclosure violation, outside directors who reasonably relied on the opinion would
have a very strong argument that they should be free from liability.  The SEC could provide
a safe harbor for such a director under its exemptive authority pursuant to its authority
under Exchange Act sections 3(f) and 36.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f)15, 78mm.  Some prominent
commentators have even argued that outside directors should not be liable at all.  See
Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability:  A
Policy Analysis, 162 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 5, 6, 17 (2006) (suggesting liability
for outside directors would “discourag[e] good candidates from serving, caus[e]
counterproductive risk-avoidance among those who do serve, and induc[e] directors to
focus unduly on taking procedural precautions designed to protect against liability”).
122. Imposing on the gatekeeper the task of proving nonnegligence has a number of
advantages over putting the burden on the plaintiff.  There is less chance of legal error
because the gatekeeper has most of the information about whether it met its standard of
care.  Assaf Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105 Mich. L. Rev.
1677, 1693 (2007) (explaining benefits of “reverse negligence” regime).  Moreover, the
social resources consumed by the plaintiffs’ lawyers, and the fee needed to be paid to them
to induce them to bring actions where they are socially warranted, would be substantially
less than in fraud-on-the-market suits since they would not need to show that the defendant
had scienter, simply the existence of a material misstatement and a loss caused by the
misstatement.  This is often not difficult, for example in the case of an earnings
restatement immediately followed by a sharp price drop.
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Given that the primary function of civil liability under this plan is deter-
rence, insurance should also probably be prohibited, at least in the case
of officers and directors.
At first glance, the case for prohibiting the external certifier from
obtaining insurance might appear to be the stronger one, since the certi-
fier’s only function in this scheme is to investigate the truthfulness and
adequacy of the issuer’s annual report.  Closer analysis, though, shows
that it might not seriously undermine the system to allow the external
certifier to obtain insurance, because the insurance provider would have
strong incentives to monitor the adequacy of the external certifier’s due
diligence practices and any certifier seeking such insurance would have a
strong incentive to minimize its premiums.
Any analysis of denying insurance for officers and directors must
start with the recognition that, unlike the external certifier, officers and
directors have important functions beyond assuring the quality of their
company’s securities disclosures.  The normal justification for having the
issuer purchase directors and officers (D&O) insurance is that it is neces-
sary to attract qualified people to do these other tasks.  The risk of a large
judgment being imposed erroneously, the argument goes, would make
such a person unwilling to serve without insurance.123  The point of put-
ting liability on directors and officers, however, is deterrence, not com-
pensation.  If deterrence is to be maintained, allowing issuer-paid D&O
insurance for disclosure violations becomes highly problematic.  Unlike
the external certifier, it would be the issuer, not the insured, who would
pay for the policy.  The officers and directors might be able to prompt
the issuer, in a nontransparent transaction, to buy a policy that, in return
for being expensive, involves little scrutiny of the history and procedures
of the covered officers and directors.  Shareholders would end up paying
for this low-scrutiny policy.  Furthermore, the available empirical evi-
dence suggests that D&O insurance providers do little to monitor issuers
in order to prevent misrepresentations and that their risk assessment and
pricing policies send only a weak deterrence signal.124  The more appro-
priate solution to maintaining deterrence, while still allowing issuers to
attract qualified directors and officers, is to limit the impact of the risk
associated with the possibility of an erroneous judgment by providing for
damage caps (related, perhaps, to an individual’s compensation from the
firm or the individual’s total wealth)125 and by providing, ex ante, a suffi-
123. See R. Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, Commentary from the Bar,
Elimination or Limitation of Director Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 Del. J. Corp.
L. 5, 9 (1987) (“Many directors have resigned from their positions or have declined to seek
to renew their terms as such when liability insurance is unavailable, and many qualified
individuals have refused to accept directorships initially.”).
124. Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance:
The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 Geo. L.J. 1795, 1798–99 (2007).
125. In 2005, the government of Ontario, Canada, amended the Ontario Securities
Act to provide for civil liability for secondary market disclosure violations.  See supra note
28.  For a liable director or officer of a responsible issuer, damages are limited to the R
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cient boost in salary or fees to compensate for the remaining risk.  It
should also be noted that the risk of an erroneous judgment against an
officer or director is reduced where she, rather than the plaintiff, has the
evidentiary burden with respect to the standard of care, since most of the
information relevant to that determination is within her possession.126
3. Rationale for Damages Being Proportional to the Issuer’s Annual Total
Investment. — Why choose the firm’s total investment for a year, I, as the
amount of the phantom offering from which officer, director, and exter-
nal certifier liability is calculated?  The answer is that whether a firm uses
external or internal funds to finance its investments, it ought to expose
itself to the scrutiny of the mandatory disclosure process in proportion to
the total amount of such investments, especially given the poor invest-
ment record of firms that rely primarily on internally generated funds.127
Also, total investment is usually a reasonable proxy for firm size.  The
absolute value of the social gains from a given degree of improvement in
the alignment of the interests of management and shareholders should
be roughly proportional to firm size.  The larger the firm, the larger the
social gain from the realignment.  The same is true of the reduction in
cost of capital from disclosure-induced increased liquidity.  These obser-
vations socially justify a proportionally greater amount of resources being
devoted to due diligence for larger firms.  The prospect of a larger ex-
pected damage award if the due diligence fails to avert a misstatement
will prompt this increase in resources.
To the extent that the ratio of a firm’s total investment to firm size
deviates from the average (making total investment a less reliable proxy
for firm size), the deviation in turn reflects the rate at which the firm is
changing.  A higher than average ratio would suggest that the firm is
changing faster than the average firm.  For any given firm size, a faster
rate of change would call for more thorough periodic disclosure and
hence, again, greater resources devoted to due diligence.  The opposite
conclusion would follow from a below-average ratio.
This use of a firm’s total investment as a scalar for determining dam-
ages should be contrasted with the current U.S. liability system’s volume-
of-trade scalar implicit in fraud-on-the-market action damages.  The “out-
of-pocket” measure used to determine damages in such suits is, for each
purchaser of a share inflated in price by a falsely positive misstatement,
the amount by which share price was inflated at the time of purchase
(less, if it was sold prior to full revelation of the truth, the amount it was
inflated at the time of sale).128  Thus, the total damages owed by the de-
greater of C$25,000 or fifty percent of the aggregate of the director’s or officer’s annual
compensation from the responsible issuer and its affiliates.  Ontario Securities Act, Part
XXIII.1, R.S.O., ch. S.5, § 138.3 (1990).
126. Hamdani & Kraakman, supra note 122, at 1693. R
127. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
128. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661–62 (1986); Green v. Occidental
Petrol. Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341–46 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring); Estate
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fendants is a sum equal to (x) the number of shares that were purchased
at least once during the period that the price was inflated, times (y) the
amount by which each such share was inflated at the time of its first
purchase during such period.129  For issuers of any given size, the volume
of trading varies considerably from one issuer to the next and from one
period to the next.  These variations have no obvious connection to the
gains in corporate governance and reduced cost of capital arising from
better disclosure and thus would appear not to be appropriate factors to
be considered in calculating damages.
4. Procedures for Recovery. — Under this Article’s proposal, any share-
holder could bring a suit on behalf of the corporation against an officer,
director, or external certifier in much the same fashion as a shareholder
can now bring a suit to recover short swing profits under section 16(b) of
the Exchange Act.  Attorney’s fees would be available for successful plain-
tiffs, as they are under section 16(b).130
Given these proposed procedures, entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers
would obviously continue to drive civil liability actions against nonissuer
defendants for disclosure violations since, except when there has been a
radical change of management, current directors and officers will not in-
duce an issuer to sue themselves or recently departed directors and of-
ficers with whom they served.  The central role of the entrepreneurial
plaintiffs’ lawyer should be explicitly recognized, not treated like an awk-
ward embarrassment.  Thus, there is no place in this proposed scheme
for the corporate law contemporaneous ownership rule requiring the
plaintiff bringing a derivative suit to have been a shareholder at the time
of the misdeed.131  If any shareholding is required, a law firm wishing to
bring a suit on behalf of an issuer should be able to qualify simply by
buying a share at the time of filing.132  There remains the problem of
how to choose among competing plaintiffs’ firms, each of which wants to
bring the case on behalf of an issuer.  Perhaps preference should be
Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962); Loss et al.,
supra note 11, at 4413–14. R
129. For any share purchased more than once during the period when the price was
inflated, the total damages of all its purchasers under the out-of-pocket measure would
equal the amount by which the misstatement inflated price at the time of the initial
purchase.
130. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006);
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1943).
131. See 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2010 (2004).  The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure also impose a contemporaneous ownership requirement on shareholders
bringing derivative suits.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
132. A suit to recover short swing profits under section 16(b) of the Exchange Act
may be brought by the “owner of any security of the issuer.”  15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).  Courts
have consistently held that the plaintiff in a 16(b) action need not have held the issuer’s
securities at the time of the alleged short swing transaction.  William E. Aiken, Jr.,
Annotation, Who Is “Issuer” or “Owner of Any Security of the Issuer” for Purposes of
Enforcing Short-Swing Profits Provisions of § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
51 A.L.R. Fed. 785, 789–90 (1981).
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given to a firm that has the approval of one of the issuer’s large noncon-
trolling shareholders, akin to the lead plaintiff system under the
PSLRA.133
D. Class Action and Derivative Suit Litigation Concerns
The agency problems associated with plaintiff lawyer representation
in securities class actions and corporate derivative suits in the United
States have given rise to considerable concern in both the scholarly litera-
ture and in general discussion over the last couple of decades.134  Two
concerns in particular have been raised.  First, some commentators say
that the United States has experienced too many “strike suits”:  meritless
securities law claims brought by plaintiffs’ class action lawyers to obtain
attorney’s fees based on settlements extracted from defendants who wish
to avoid the nuisance of continuing litigation and the risk of an errone-
ous negative judgment.135  Second, there is a widespread feeling that for
those suits that should be brought, plaintiffs’ lawyers are overpaid relative
to the work they do.136  The PSLRA was in large part a legislative re-
sponse to these two concerns.137
133. The PSLRA provides that the presumptive lead plaintiff in a securities class
action is the plaintiff with the largest financial interest in the relief sought and who
otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  15
U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B).
134. See, e.g., Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench:
Judging Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L. Rev. 1239, 1259–75 (“Agency
theory posits that the nature of the private enforcement model itself, coupled with
counsel’s sizeable financial incentives, tempts plaintiffs’ lawyers to engage in opportunistic
behavior.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney:  The Implications
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative
Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 677–98 (1986) (discussing plaintiffs’ attorneys’ incentives
to litigate class and derivative suits).
135. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?  A Study of Settlements
in Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497, 524–54 (1991) (arguing that “structural
characteristics of the legal system” result in settlements “without regard to the merits”).  A
conceptually similar problem occurs in the case of a highly marginal suit where, for the
same reasons, plaintiffs’ lawyers are able to obtain a settlement much larger than the
expected value of the judgment, if any, that would result if the suit were fully litigated.
136. See id. at 541–42 (discussing incentives created by lodestar compensation of
plaintiffs’ attorneys); see also In re Quantum Health Res., Inc. Sec. Litig., 962 F. Supp.
1254, 1257–58 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that experience has shown that risk justifying large
contingency fees in securities class actions does not exist); Richard W. Painter, The New
American Rule:  A First Amendment to the Client’s Bill of Rights, in Manhattan Institute,
2000 Civil Justice Report 1, 1–2 (2000), available at http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/
html/cjr_1.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that market for contingency
fee lawyers is not competitive, thus leading to inefficiencies and overcompensation).
137. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  It is unclear, however,
whether the PSLRA makes it more difficult to bring meritless fraud-on-the-market suits
relative to the difficulty of bringing suits with merit, or whether it simply makes it more
difficult to bring all fraud-on-the-market suits.  The distinction is important.  If all the
weight of the PSLRA’s restrictions falls on nonmeritorious actions, then it helps solve the
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The claim might be made that implementing the liability scheme
proposed here in the United States would aggravate these problems be-
cause when the issuer is not offering securities, the nonissuer actors
would be more open to liability than is the case today.  In fact, however, I
believe that the overall scheme moves in the direction of reducing these
problems.  The proposed scheme would eliminate fraud-on-the-market
suits against issuers not offering securities that are based on misstate-
ments in a mandatory disclosure filing.  It would also eliminate all such
suits based on any statement made outside such a filing if a similar state-
ment were made in such a filing prior to, or at the same time as, the
statement made outside.  The substantial majority of all payments made
by issuers today in connection with settlements or judgments relating to
securities litigation arise precisely out of these kinds of actions.138  For a
problems of class actions without lessening deterrence.  To the extent that it also makes it
more difficult to bring actions with merit, however, any reduction in the class action
problems comes at the cost of reduced deterrence.  Overall, the evidence suggests that the
PSLRA does in fact impose this tradeoff, though it does not resolve whether any reduction
in the social costs associated with nonmeritorious suits is greater than any social losses
associated with a reduced number of successful meritorious suits.  Professors Johnson,
Nelson, and Pritchard concluded that case quality may have improved post-PSLRA, finding
a closer empirical relation between factors indicating fraud (restatements and abnormal
insider stock sales) and securities class action filings.  See Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K.
Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, Do the Merits Matter More?  The Impact of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 627, 648–49 (2007).  Stephen Choi argued that
although the PSLRA deters some frivolous suits, it has also deterred certain meritorious
suits.  Choi found that the PSLRA probably deters nonfrivolous securities lawsuits in two
situations:  those involving smaller companies with small offerings or low secondary market
turnover and those where companies engage in fraud but there is a lack of prefiling hard
evidence of that fraud.  See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 598, 622–23 (2007); see also
Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 913, 969 (arguing that PSLRA did not reduce nonmeritorious filings); Eric Talley &
Gudrun Johnsen, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation and Securities
Litigation 26 (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch.,  Olin Research Paper No. 04-7, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=536963 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Our results
appear inconsistent with the claims of the statute’s proponents that the PSLRA
systematically discouraged frivolous litigation without burdening meritorious claims.”).
138. Because of the difficulty of meeting the traditional reliance requirements in a
class action, most Rule 10b-5 class actions are fraud-on-the-market suits.  See supra note 16. R
From 1997 to 2004, Rule 10b-5 claims were involved in over ninety-five percent of the
settlements, while section 11 or section 12(a)(2) claims were involved in only twenty
percent of the settlements.  Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan, Cornerstone Research,
Post-Reform Act Securities Settlements:  Updated Through December 2004, at 17 (2005),
available at http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/Settlements_2004.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (providing securities class action settlement statistics from 1997
to 2004).  Section 11 and section 12(a)(2) claims continued to be involved in only twenty
percent of securities class actions settlements through 2006.  Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M.
Ryan, Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Settlements:  2006 Review and
Analysis 9 (2007), available at http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/Settlements_2006.
pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Two features make fraud-on-the-market class actions particularly vulnerable to strike
suits and to highly marginal suits that extract disproportionately large settlements relative
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number of reasons, these problems would occur less frequently under the
new substitute causes of action proposed here than under the eliminated
fraud-on-the-market actions.
1. Reduced Frequency of Occasions to Sue. — The proposed scheme
should reduce the frequency of disclosure violations and hence the fre-
quency of the occasions that give rise to the new substitute causes of ac-
tion.  Today, outside the certified financials, the persons making disclo-
sure decisions—corporate managers—are not subjected to any kind of
outside review.  And while they face the possibility that a disclosure viola-
tion will result in the issuer needing to make a payout in response to a
fraud-on-the-market suit that in turn could hurt the managers deriva-
tively, only a slight chance exists that they will have to make a payout
personally as a result of the action.139
The scheme proposed here introduces a prophylactic procedure that
should reduce the number of disclosure violations in the first instance.
Managers would need the approval of an external certifier that would
face liability directly if the certifier certified a filing containing a disclo-
sure violation that could have been caught by reasonable investigation.
Without the certification requirement, a manager who knows negative
information that should be disclosed may, out of dread of the sharp share
price drop that disclosure would cause, decide not to comply.  The exter-
nal certifier is not in the same position.  An unhappy customer is the
worst that can happen to the certifier if it insists on compliance.  Moreo-
to the expected value of a fully litigated judgment.  First, the typical issuer does not expect
to encounter such suits frequently.  According to one study, the average public corporation
has only a 1.9% probability of facing a shareholder class action lawsuit in a given year.
Ronald I. Miller, Todd Foster & Elaine Buckberg, NERA Consulting, Recent Trends in
Shareholder Class Action Litigation:  Beyond the Mega-Settlements, Is Stabilization Ahead?
3 (2006), available at http://www.nera.com/image/BRO_RecentTrends2006_SEC979_
PPB-FINAL.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  Thus, for an issuer, there is little
reward in fighting such action simply to develop a reputation that the issuer will resist
meritless and highly marginal actions in the future.  Instead, a rational issuer will compare
the cost of settlement with the expected cost of continuing to litigate the action, which,
once a case survives a motion to dismiss and discovery begins, is very substantial.  See
Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1465, 1469
(2004) (describing high costs that pressure companies to settle even frivolous securities
suits); Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 Int’l
Rev. L. & Econ. 3, 5 (1990) (describing and modeling incentives facing plaintiffs and
defendants with respect to settlement of frivolous lawsuits).  Second, if a meritless case is
fully litigated, there is always the possibility of legal error.  The potential damages
associated with an adverse fraud-on-the-market judgment make this risk hard to take.
Damages can be huge relative to the size of the company, at least in the situation where the
misstatement inflates price for a long time and trading has been heavy.  Rather than “bet
the company,” the issuer settles for a substantial amount.
139. See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director
Liability, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1055, 1059–60, 1080 (2006) [hereinafter Black, Cheffins &
Klausner, Director Liability] (noting that outside directors rarely contribute to securities
class action settlements); Coffee, Reforming, supra note 18, at 1550 (noting that corporate R
managers rarely contribute to securities class action settlements).
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ver, managers are likely to rationalize and downplay the importance of
any bad news for which their actions are at least partly responsible.  Exter-
nal certifier personnel, who have no such connection, are more likely to
be objective.
2. Smaller Judgments and Settlements Yield Smaller Fees. — The judg-
ments rendered under these substitute causes of action, and the settle-
ments in their shadow, are likely to involve considerably smaller amounts
in damages.  The amount of liability imposed on officers, directors, and
the external certifier under the scheme proposed here will be much less
than the typical aggregate recovery in a Securities Act section 11 suit
where the issuer is still solvent.  In the phantom section 11 case that
forms the model for nonissuer liability under the proposed scheme, after
the settling up that would occur through contribution actions (or more
typically in their shadow), the issuer would bear the bulk of what would
be owed (which I termed the “Total Liability”).140  The amount borne by
the nonissuer defendants in the phantom case, which determines what
they owe under the proposed scheme, would be only the remainder.
Moreover, the Total Liability itself will be smaller than the typical recov-
ery in a fraud-on-the-market suit.  Turnover in the shares of large, estab-
lished issuers is rapid enough that typically the aggregate value of an is-
suer’s shares that have been traded at least once in the secondary market
during the period that a misstatement inflates the issuer’s share price141
is greater than the amount a firm typically invests in a year.142
140. See supra Part IV.C.2.b.  Black, Cheffins, and Klausner found that actual
payments of damages for securities lawsuits and state corporate lawsuits “are nearly always
made by the companies involved—either directly or pursuant to directors’ rights to
indemnification—or by a D&O insurer, a major shareholder, or another third party.”
Black, Cheffins & Klausner, Director Liability, supra note 139, at 1059–60.  In a section 11 R
case, the company is the most attractive defendant because it is held strictly liable.  Id. at
1080.
141. Since the 1980s, the average annual turnover rate has continued to approach
100% annually.  See Louis Lowenstein, What’s Wrong with Wall Street:  Short-Term Gain
and the Absentee Shareholder 66–68 (1988) (noting that annual turnover rate for major
exchange listed stock in 1986 was approximately eighty-seven percent); Robert J. Shiller,
Irrational Exuberance 39 (2000) (noting that in 1999, average annual turnover rate for
NYSE-listed stocks was seventy-eight percent, while average annual turnover rate for stocks
on NASDAQ was 221%); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as
Corporate Governance:  Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 859, 902 (2003)
(finding average turnover rate to be approximately 100%).  Casual empiricism suggests
that the typical period of price inflation alleged in plaintiffs’ class action complaints ranges
from a few months to a few years.
142. As of January 2007, for the average publicly traded company with a market
capitalization of at least one billion dollars, capital expenditures as a fraction of the firm’s
total market value were approximately 5.7%.  This figure is the author’s own calculation
using data from the Value Line Database, which provides accounting and market data for
approximately 7,000 public companies on a monthly basis.  (Capital expenditures data was
reported in the most recent 10-K as of January 2007; market capitalization data was the
market value of equity on the last trading day of 2006.)
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The aggregate liability imposed on officers, directors, and the exter-
nal certifier will be considerably smaller under the scheme proposed here
than it would be under a conventional securities class action today for a
comparable misstatement by a comparably sized firm.  Accordingly, any
set percentage of this aggregate liability will also be smaller.  If plaintiffs’
lawyers are awarded twenty percent to thirty percent (which is typical of
all but the very large settlements and judgments)143 of this smaller aggre-
gate liability, there is less incentive for them to bring a frivolous suit.  For
the same reason, overpayments of plaintiffs’ lawyers will occur less often
in the case of meritorious actions.
3. Fewer Settlements Driven by Fear of Legal Error. — Risk-averse issuer
managers may settle meritless fraud-on-the-market suits against the issuer
due to fear of legal error and the resulting potential for damages that are
a substantial portion of the total value of the company.  The causes of
action that the proposal here would substitute for fraud-on-the-market
actions are less vulnerable to this problem.  To start, as noted above, the
risk of an erroneous judgment against the defendant is less because the
evidence relating to standard of care—the steps taken to perform due
diligence—rests in the defendant’s possession.
Also, as discussed, the amount of damages in absolute terms will be
much lower.  For the external certifier, this lower absolute amount
should, by the very design of the proposed system, be a relatively small
fraction of the certifier’s total net worth.  Thus, unlike fraud-on-the-mar-
ket suits against issuers, litigating to the point of judgment should not
involve a “bet the company” type risk.  For the officers and directors, the
lower absolute amount of damages may be more than counterbalanced
by the fact that it is individuals who will be paying these damages.  But if
sensible caps are put in place related either to an individual’s net worth
or the income or fees that the individual earns from the issuer, then they
too should not be driven to settle a meritless claim out of fear of being
devastated should legal error occur.
Because external certifiers and officers and directors are less likely to
be driven to settle meritless claims out of fear of legal error, plaintiffs’
lawyers are less likely to bring such actions.  If they do so, they run a large
risk of expending all the resources necessary to take a case to trial without
obtaining anything in return.
4. The Person Making the Decision Will Pay the Settlement and the Issuer
Will Receive It. — Fraud-on-the-market strike suits are attracted by the fact
that the prospective settlements that give rise to them will be agreed to
from the defense side by the firm’s officers and directors.  The officers
and directors are typically defendants themselves, but in almost all cases,
another person—the issuer (together possibly with the issuer’s insurer)—
pays all, or nearly all, the cost of the settlement.144  Under the scheme
143. See supra note 18. R
144. Coffee, Reforming, supra note 18, at 1550. R
\\server05\productn\C\COL\109-2\COL201.txt unknown Seq: 60 23-FEB-09 11:10
296 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 109:237
proposed here, at least in the case of directors and officers, the persons
deciding to enter into the settlement would pay out of their own pockets
and therefore can be expected to drive a harder bargain and to be less
likely to settle just to make a nuisance go away.145  Again, if defendants
are less likely to settle meritless claims for a significant amount of money,
plaintiffs’ lawyers will be less likely to bring them because of the risk of
incurring substantial expense with no return.
Under the proposed scheme, the directors’ and officers’ settlement
decision is changed in another way as well because the issuer, not former
shareholders, is paid the settlement.  This has important consequences
for the concern that plaintiffs’ lawyers are paid too much when they bring
actions with actual merit.  When an issuer’s officers and directors approve
the settlement of a fraud-on-the-market suit involving falsely positive in-
formation, their main concern is with the size of the gross settlement.
They are relatively indifferent toward the portion of that gross amount
that goes to plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fees and the portion that goes to the mem-
bers of the class.  This is because the class consists of many persons who
sold the issuer’s stock and therefore typically are no longer shareholders.
This and the fact that class members lack control over their lawyer repre-
sentatives makes the size of the plaintiffs’ lawyer’s fee in a class action
case subject to judicial supervision and allows class members to object to
the court about a proposed fee award.146  This procedure, however, is
generally regarded as a relatively ineffective means for controlling the
size of the fees.147
Under the scheme proposed here, every dollar that goes to the plain-
tiffs’ lawyers is a dollar that does not go to the company.  While a defen-
145. Even for the external certifier, its managers would probably be less inclined to
agree to extra dollars in settlement than issuer managers in a fraud-on-the-market suit.
The payout would reduce the net operating revenues for the certifier, which is in the
business of covering such litigation risks, whereas it would be an extraordinary item for the
issuer.  A decline in earnings due to lower net operating revenues is generally regarded by
investors as more serious than a decline due to an extraordinary item because it has more
predictive power in terms of a company’s future cash flow.  Also, compared to the issuer,
the external certifier is more likely to be a repeat defendant since, at any one time, it will
presumably be the certifier of a number of issuers.  Potential repeat defendants have a
greater incentive to establish a reputation of not being willing to settle meritless claims just
to get rid of nuisances.
146. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for judicial supervision of attorney
fees in a class action.  The court must approve any settlement and may propose terms for
attorney fees and hold a hearing on an attorney fees award.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), (h).
147. Many commentators argue that judicial supervision of class action settlements
and attorney fees is largely ineffective, due to information problems, judicial
misinterpretation of, or apathy toward, class members’ input, and the judge’s vested
interest in settling a case.  See, e.g., Alon Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty:
Selection and Monitoring of Class Counsel, 22 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 69, 90–91 (2004);
Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence:  Collective Action Problems and Class
Action Settlements, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 71, 72, 107–10 (2007); William B. Rubenstein, The
Fairness Hearing:  Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1435,
1444–45 (2006).
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dant’s primary concern is going to be with the dollars she is paying out,
she still is better off if the money goes to her company than to the lawyers
on the other side.
5. Problem May Be that the Fees Are Too Low. — The problem may in
fact run in the opposite direction.  The percentage of recovery awarded
as a contingent fee may actually need to be increased to ensure that suits
with a reasonable prospect of recovery will be brought.  This need,
though, is tempered by the fact that the actions contemplated in the
scheme proposed here involve less work for the plaintiffs’ lawyer than do
fraud-on-the-market suits.  Whereas the plaintiff must establish scienter in
the fraud-on-the-market suit, the defendant has the burden with respect
to his standard of culpability in the scheme proposed here.148
V. THE CURRENT DISCUSSION ON LIABILITY
The liability scheme proposed above can be elucidated, and perhaps
refined, by considering it in terms of other scholarly commentary on the
subject over the last decade.  I will consider issues raised by three promi-
nent securities law scholars who have discussed securities law liability in
recent years, in each case prompted at least in part by the movement in
the United States toward company registration or by concerns about
problems with class actions.  Each commentator has struck a somewhat
different theme.  Stephen Choi has suggested that the firms that would
qualify for company registration and that are the subject of this inquiry—
established firms whose shares trade in efficient markets—should not be
subject to a liability scheme as stringent as is currently the case because
the current scheme generates frivolous, costly litigation.149  He suggests
that for such firms, greater reliance on market mechanisms that help as-
sure the availability of adequate information about firms would be more
cost effective.150  Donald Langevoort expresses concern with the inade-
quate quality of periodic disclosure, particularly since it is becoming the
central source of information about issuers even when they are offering
securities.151  Like me, he favors some kind of outside certification of pe-
148. See supra note 122. R
149. See Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration:  Toward a Status-Based Antifraud
Regime, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 567, 588–91 (1997) [hereinafter Choi, Company Registration]
(arguing that antifraud liability should be reduced for larger, more highly capitalized
companies because those companies attract more frivolous litigation).
150. See id. at 573, 628, 649–50 (“Where companies trade in an efficient market . . . a
company registration system could rely heavily on the market to transmit information on
the company to all investors.”).
151. See Donald C. Langevoort, Deconstructing Section 11:  Public Offering Liability
in a Continuous Disclosure Environment, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 2000, at 45,
47, 52–55, 62 [hereinafter Langevoort, Deconstructing] (arguing that current disclosure
regime is “largely satisfactory as a conceptual matter, although public resources for
enforcing that regime are woefully lacking”).
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riodic disclosure as a partial response.152  But he also feels that because of
the difficulty of conducting due diligence in the new world of rapid offer-
ings, nonissuer actors should not be subject to any more liability at the
time of a public offering than they currently are when there is no offer-
ing, i.e., they should be liable only when they are shown to have scien-
ter.153  He suggests improving periodic disclosure through some kind of
internal compliance program.154  John Coffee expresses a similar con-
cern with the existing quality of periodic disclosure, but he too, for rea-
sons similar to Langevoort’s, favors reducing the stringency of liability for
nonissuer actors when the issuer is offering securities.155  He has sug-
gested a system of certification of annual reports by outside disclosure
counsel, which he argues is a superior approach to the external certifier
suggested here.156  He also favors a liability system that would continue to
exempt all issuers from liability absent a showing of scienter if a disclo-
sure violation occurs during a private placement because of the due dili-
gence that the financial intermediaries purchasing the securities can pro-
vide.157  The views of these commentators raise a number of points
worthy of comparison with the approach presented here.
A. The Relationship of Size and Stringency of Issuer Liability
Is the liability system proposed here moving us in the wrong direc-
tion by increasing the currently prevailing stringency of liability imposed
on nonissuer actors in cases where an issuer is not offering securities,
instead of reducing the currently prevailing stringency of liability on all
actors in cases where such an issuer is offering securities?
Professor Choi suggests that we should move in this other direction
and reduce the liability imposed on larger, more established firms when
they offer securities.158  One basis for his suggestion is that larger firms
attract more frivolous litigation because they have more money.159  This
is undoubtedly true.  But for the same reasons, such firms also attract
more nonfrivolous litigation.  Indeed, Choi’s own research indicates that
152. See id. at 47 (calling for creation of “a much more determinate obligation on the
part of seasoned issuers to implement an efficient disclosure monitoring system”).
153. See id. (suggesting negligence-based liability for insiders, and scienter-based
liability for others).
154. See id. at 62 (suggesting that “boards take reasonable systemic steps to assure
compliance with periodic disclosure obligations”).
155. See Coffee, Re-Engineering, supra note 11, at 1166–68 (suggesting that R
arguments for increased disclosure to investors require only “modest adjustment in the
company registration scheme”).
156. See Coffee, Gatekeepers, supra note 19, at 347–52. R
157. See Coffee, Re-Engineering, supra note 11, at 1147, 1182–85, 1187 (finding R
institutional investors to be adequate gatekeepers).
158. See Choi, Company Registration, supra note 149, at 588 (arguing in favor of R
tailoring market-based antifraud mechanisms).
159. See id. at 589 (attributing such targeting to plaintiffs’ lawyers seeking large
settlements from large companies due to increased monetary incentives).
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small firms attract little of either.160  Choi makes no showing that large
size contributes more to Type I error—more money paid out in settle-
ment of frivolous claims—than it reduces Type II error—fewer disclosure
violations that fail to generate civil liability or settlement payments in its
shadow.  Absent such a showing, there seems to be no reason why the
tendency of size to attract frivolous litigation justifies a reduction in the
stringency of liability imposed on larger, more established firms.  It
should also be noted that larger size in one sense already makes it harder
for a plaintiff to establish liability.  This is because for a disclosure viola-
tion of a larger firm to be considered material and hence actionable, it
must have a larger absolute effect on investors and, consequently, on the
economy.
A second basis for Choi’s suggestion that disclosure liability in con-
nection with large firms be reduced is the idea that the market mecha-
nisms for assuring the market has adequate information about an issuer
work more effectively with larger firms.161  Choi cites the greater availabil-
ity of contra information stemming from analysts’ closer scrutiny of larger
publicly traded issuers.162  This, again, may be true, but it ignores that the
issuer is generally the least cost provider of the information mandatory
disclosure requires.  Moreover, an important function of mandatory dis-
closure is to correct a market failure by prompting issuers to provide in-
formation when the private benefits to managers are less than the costs to
them and where the social benefits are greater than the social costs.163
Without regulation, an issuer will often be disinclined to disclose such
information even when doing so would trigger a net social gain.
Choi also suggests that the officers and directors of established issu-
ers have more to lose reputationally from not complying with disclosure
regulations and that the same is true of the investment banks underwrit-
ing the offerings of such issuers.164  These factors, however, would appear
to be counterbalanced by the fact that compliance of a larger firm is
more socially important since the resulting improvement in disclosure
improves the efficiency with which more of society’s scarce resources are
allocated.
B. Standard of Liability of Nonissuer Actors
Professors Langevoort and Coffee express concern that imposing ab-
solute liability subject to a due diligence defense on officers, directors,
and underwriters, as section 11 does, is unfair because the speed with
which public offerings now go forward in this near-company-registration
160. See id. at 599.
161. See id. at 581–83.
162. See id. at 581.
163. See Coffee, Market Failure, supra note 36, at 722 (arguing that validity for this R
theory is limited); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 84, at 684–85, 687 (advocating for, R
but noting limits on, self-induced disclosure).
164. See Choi, Company Registration, supra note 149, at 583–84. R
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world makes such diligence impractical.165  Their reluctance to deal with
the problem by instead imposing this kind of stringent liability on disclo-
sure violations in periodic disclosure reports—a setting where such dili-
gence is practical—may arise from a failure to recognize the equal social
value of periodic disclosure whether or not the issuer is offering securi-
ties.  It should also be noted that issuer and nonissuer actor liability can
be separated in this situation with the nonissuer liability confined within
sensible limits, unrelated, unlike current fraud-on-the-market suits, to the
amount of trading that occurs in the secondary market during the period
of the violation.
Choi also states that if gatekeepers are worthwhile, issuer managers
will have incentives to provide them voluntarily.166  This statement again
ignores the market failure justification for mandatory disclosure and,
where the choice of the disclosure regime is voluntary, the need for some
kind of civil liability system to help bond management to any commit-
ments it makes at the time of sale of securities to provide ongoing peri-
odic disclosure in the future.  Because of the divergence between the pri-
vate and social costs of issuer disclosure, it may be in an issuer’s best
interest not to hire a gatekeeper that would prompt greater disclosure
even though it is in society’s interest that it do so.
Finally, Professor Choi again suggests that because market mecha-
nisms are more effective with larger issuers, there is less need for nonis-
suer actor liability.167  This suggestion is subject to the same critique as
was provided above.168
C. Critiques of the External Certifier
Professor Coffee has commented on the idea of using a certifying
investment bank—the most obvious kind of external certifier—as a way of
taking the investment banker’s traditional gatekeeping function in the
context of underwritten public offerings and recreating it to assure the
quality of periodic disclosure.169  He finds the idea “feasible,”170 but of-
fers three critiques.  First, he suggests that it will be costly because an
investment bank would demand a high fee before it would accept the
accompanying liability.171  It is not clear, however, why in a competitive
market the cost of an investment bank or other external certifier would
not equal the social cost of the proposal, i.e., the opportunity cost of the
165. See Coffee, Re-Engineering, supra note 11, at 1147-49; Langevoort, R
Deconstructing, supra note 151, at 46.  My proposal would eliminate underwriter liability R
altogether for this very reason.  See supra Part IV.C.2.e.
166. See Choi, Company Registration, supra note 149, at 584–87. R
167. See id. at 587.
168. See supra Part V.A.
169. See Coffee, Gatekeepers, supra note 19, at 352–53.  For the first proposal of this R
idea, at the time that integrated disclosure was introduced, see Fox, Shelf Registration,
supra note 12, at 1034. R
170. Coffee, Gatekeepers, supra note 19, at 353. R
171. See id.
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personnel necessary to conduct the due diligence plus the expected value
of the residual costs of litigation judgments, settlements, and legal fees.
This cost was traditionally deemed worthwhile to assure quality disclosure
at the time of a public offering.  This Article argues that high-quality peri-
odic disclosure is equally valuable socially, and hence also worth this
cost.172  Moreover, the costs of the proposed scheme, which aims to
prophylactically prevent poor disclosure, must be compared with the cost
of our current periodic disclosure violation deterrence system, the fraud-
on-the-market suit.
Second, Coffee suggests that the idea has already been tried on the
AIM market in London.173  He claims that it has been shown to have the
disadvantage of tying issuers closely to a single investment bank, with the
result that there is little competition among bankers for the issuer’s busi-
ness.  The bank can therefore extract monopoly rents from its situa-
tion.174  It is not clear, however, that this would be a serious problem
under the proposed scheme.  It is true that if the external certifier were
an investment bank, there would be synergies in the certifying bank being
a lead underwriter in a subsequent public offering because the certifying
bank has done the research necessary to assure itself that it wishes to
associate its name and reputational capital with the issuer.  This is the
limit of the tie, however, and any rents extracted cannot be greater than
the rents extracted by someone for the amount of due diligence that
should properly be done at some point close to the time of the offering.
Importantly, the proposed scheme would not impose liability on the un-
derwriter at the time of an offering for issuer misstatements and so other
underwriters would not be at a competitive disadvantage relative to the
certifying bank in terms of fear of legal liability.
Coffee’s third critique of the proposed scheme is that his own propo-
sal of outside counsel certification of annual reports is a superior substi-
tute.175  He suggests that counsel certification would be less expensive
and equally effective.  As discussed more extensively above, however, an
external certifier of the kind I propose is better situated to play this gate-
keeper role for several reasons.176  Unlike a law firm, the skill set of an
investment bank or other qualified external certifier includes projecting
future cash flows.  The certifier is fully capable of delegating responsibil-
ity for those portions of the work that lawyers or accountants could do
better.  An investment bank, in particular, is already experienced at doing
this kind of due diligence.  For an entity, investment bank or otherwise,
to qualify as an external certifier, it must be sufficiently capitalized that its
incentives will not be compromised by the possibility of being judgment
proof.  Law firms, even large ones, are not highly capitalized because of
172. See supra Part II.
173. See Coffee, Gatekeepers, supra note 19, at 338–40, 353–55. R
174. See id. at 353–54.
175. See id. at 356.
176. See supra Part IV.A.2.
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the nature of their business and the limitations imposed on their meth-
ods of financing by professional regulations.  Thus, law firms run the risk
of being so compromised.  Finally, if lawyers really could perform the
same kind of due diligence and face similar liabilities when they fail, it is
not obvious why they would in fact be less costly.
D. Private Placements
Some full-fledged proposals for company registration impose the
same liability system on all sales of securities, whether private or public.
This, for example, appears to have been the position of a majority of the
members of the SEC’s Advisory Committee chaired by former
Commissioner Steven Wallman.177  The Committee’s report suggests sev-
eral benefits that would arise from the abolition of the private placement
exemption.  These include elimination of the legally complex distinction
between private and public offerings and some of the accompanying con-
cepts such as integration and gun jumping,178 the elimination of restric-
tions on resales by affiliates and statutory underwriters that were devel-
oped to prevent evasion of the registration rules by means of an initial
private sale followed by the purchaser engaging in a public offering,179
the claimed “merging” of private and public markets for securities,180 and
the problems with Regulation S foreign offerings of shares often flowing
rapidly back and being traded in the United States in a way that suggests
that the offering abroad was simply an effort to try to evade U.S. registra-
tion provisions.181
Professor Coffee, on the other hand, has argued for retention of the
private placement exemption.182  He has two rationales.  First, an issuer
may possess material nonpublic information that is not required to be
disclosed absent a sale.183  It may be contrary to the issuer’s interest to
177. In the Wallman Report, the Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and
Regulatory Process explored what a full-fledged company registration system would look
like and recommended a voluntary pilot program.  See Wallman Report, supra note 11, at R
i–xvi (summarizing committee’s findings).  The report suggested a number of benefits
from eliminating the exemption for private placements.  Id. at 19.  Professor Coffee has
stated that this was the preferred position of some members of the Committee.  Coffee, Re-
Engineering, supra note 11, at 1180.  The Advisory Committee, however, decided that in its R
proposed pilot program, each issuer accepting the SEC’s invitation to join a company
registration system should have, at the time it joins, the option of a system with or without a
private placement exemption.  It gave as its reason a concern that “at this initial stage and
until issuers become comfortable with the company registration concept, the loss of the
ability to conduct exempt private placement and offshore offerings could be a deterrent to
the voluntary use of the company registration system.”  Wallman Report, supra, at 34–35.
178. See Wallman Report, supra note 11, at 33. R
179. Id. at 34.
180. Id. at A-48.
181. Id. at A-55; see also supra note 91 and accompanying text (describing Regulation R
S).
182. See Coffee, Re-Engineering, supra note 11, at 1180–82. R
183. Id. at 1180.
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disclose the information publicly, but the issuer can trust a private buyer
to keep the information confidential.184  Second, institutional purchasers
in private transactions, if forced to hold onto securities for a period
before reselling to the public, will perform a due diligence role that sub-
stitutes for the due diligence done by underwriters in a public offering.185
Coffee suggests that the argument is strengthened by the fact that under-
writer due diligence—the source of comparison—will be weakened by
the smaller size of many of the deals likely to be done under company
registration (“just in time capital”) and the greater speed with which all
deals, big or small, will be done.186
Ultimately the SEC, when it moved further toward company registra-
tion by adopting the new offering regulations in late 2005, did not go as
far as the majority of the Advisory Committee recommended.187  Be-
cause, as a formal matter, the issuer chooses whether the shares involved
in any given offer and sale are registered pursuant to the issuer’s auto-
matic shelf registration statement, the SEC effectively retained the need
for a private offering exemption.  The discussion below suggests that this
was the right choice and that, in accord with Professor Coffee,188 revisit-
ing the decision would not advance the company registration concept.
At first glance, the question of whether to retain the private offering
exemption appears to attack a nonproblem:  Why exempt transactions
involving the private offering of securities when company registration
would remove the need to register securities offerings in the first place?
When one considers civil liability, however, the question does not disap-
pear so easily.  Assume, as I propose and as would be the case under the
Advisory Committee’s proposal, that an issuer faces a higher level of civil
liability when a violation of the system’s disclosure regulations is accom-
panied by a public sale of securities than when it is accompanied by no sale
of securities.  In that event, we need to decide whether the issuer should
also face this higher level of civil liability when the violation is accompa-
nied by a private sale of securities.189  Because the question of whether a
company registration system should include a private placement exemp-
tion arises specifically due to this concern with liability, it can be an-
swered only in the context of the larger issue of what, overall, civil liability
184. Id. at 1183.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 1182–85.
187. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act
Release No. 52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722,
44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.) (announcing securities
offering reforms).
188. See supra notes 182–186 and accompanying text. R
189. Under the Securities Act of 1933, the private placement exemption, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(2) (2006), is an exemption from the requirement in section 5 that securities, to be
legally offered, must be registered.  Registration carries with it potential section 11 liability.
Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k.  An exempted transaction is not subject to
such potential liability.  § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
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in a company registration system should look like.  Thus the analysis
above of this larger issue, with its focus on the social value of disclosure
and the desirability of avoiding a distortion of choices among sources of
finance, forms a useful framework for analyzing the desirability of a pri-
vate placement exemption.
Consider first the preceding discussion of the social value of disclo-
sure.  It was established that public disclosure is equally valuable whether
or not the issuer is selling equity at the time.190  Therefore, as long as the
legal regime governing issuer disclosure is adequate for periods when the
issuer is not selling its securities, it should, subject to the qualifications set
out below, be similarly adequate when the issuer is selling securities.
When the issuer is not selling securities, the liability system proposed
above imposes civil liability sanctions only on nonissuer actors.  I have ar-
gued that this should be sufficient in terms of civil liability to guarantee
the quality of public disclosure at such times. The only recommended
modifications to this regime when a public sale of securities occurs is the
filing of updated information and imposing of absolute liability on the
issuer for any inflation in price due to a disclosure violation.  The ratio-
nale for requiring updated disclosure is to prevent a special incentive for
sales during the period between when the issuer learns of bad news and
when it must disclose the news in a periodic filing.  The rationale for
imposing liability on the issuer is to counteract the extra incentive not to
comply with disclosure regulations at the time of offering.
It appears, then, that a private placement exemption is appropriate
in the case of a private sale to one or a few large institutional purchasers.
In other words, a private placement exemption is appropriate in the case
of such a sale.  The key concern should be with the ability of the buyer or
buyers to negotiate a due diligence process and a contractual liability
scheme that would satisfy the concerns that led to the modifications rec-
ommended here in the disclosure regime at the time of public sale.  As
long as private parties cannot turn around and sell to the public before
all undisclosed material information is likely to come out, a private insti-
tutional purchaser has the needed incentives to seek updated informa-
tion and to set up its own liability scheme.191  Indeed, the solution
reached by the issuer and the private purchasers may, for these particular
parties, be less costly or more effective than the one-size-fits-all regime
imposed on public offers in terms of its meeting the concerns that gener-
ated the recommended modifications to the civil liability regime when a
public offering occurs.
Granting an exemption for private sales to institutional investors
would also promote the goal of avoiding distortions in issuer choice
among sources of finance.  It avoids the no-exemption approach’s tilt to-
190. See supra Part II.
191. The contractual regime might impose absolute liability, for example, but use a
different standard of materiality or a different measure of damages.
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ward internal funding when the public release of material information
would be untimely, one of Professor Coffee’s concerns.192  It also avoids
any liability-based distortion to an issuer’s choice among sources of exter-
nal finance.  Any gain to the issuer from choosing a private sale over a
public one reflects an issuer’s calculation that the sum of the cost of the
private approach to issuer liability and the costs of the source of finance
chosen are less than the sum of the cost of the public liability regime and
the costs of finance through a public offering.  These private costs mirror
the social costs and so the issuer’s undistorted choice should be socially
optimal.
The Advisory Committee majority’s concerns about the legal costs of
maintaining a private placement exemption seem misplaced.  It is true
that an exemption would preserve the need for legal resources to iden-
tify, and police, the border between private and public transactions, as
well as rules concerning when resales are allowed.  But in any legal re-
gime, an attempt to tailor the regime to adjust to particular situations in
ways that more precisely meet its objectives are subject to this kind of
objection.  At least as far as the private costs are concerned, if the parties
find them too burdensome, they need not avail themselves of the exemp-
tion.  Moreover, the exemption and the resale rules can be much more
focused and simple than they are today since the reasons for treating issu-
ers differently when they engage in public offerings are narrowed.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Politics
For established public corporations, the proposed scheme involves a
grand bargain.  Corporations gain by being freed from fraud-on-the-mar-
ket suits.  Public equity finance will be less expensive because corpora-
tions will no longer have to pay the expected costs of underwriter liability
currently being passed on to them.  In return, corporations must take on
the cost and inconvenience of the external certifier and must provide the
additional income necessary to compensate officers and directors for the
risks of legal error associated with their new potential liabilities.  Since
the reforms lead to cost-effective improvements in corporate governance,
the aggregate valuations of U.S. issuers should increase.  Corporations,
however, are represented by real individuals, their managers.  In terms of
their personal interests, increased transparency’s reduction in the agency
costs of management might diminish the aggregate rents received by U.S.
issuer managers.  Its more important effect probably would be redistribu-
tive, with more effective managers earning higher rents from their skills,
and less effective ones earning lower rents.  Natural conservatism is still
likely to lead to broad managerial opposition.
192. See Coffee, Re-Engineering, supra note 11, at 1183. R
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Investment banks are freed from underwriter liability and, as a result
of this cost saving, which along with competition will lower their prices,
should enjoy an increase in the amount of underwriter services de-
manded of them.  The external certifier requirement also gives them the
opportunity to extract greater rents out of their already established due
diligence skills.  Other potential external certifiers should also be
supportive.
Institutional investors are a politically important group that should
solidly favor the reform.  The increases in efficiency should translate into
an increase in value in their huge existing holdings of established pub-
licly traded issuers.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers will likely see this reform negatively.  While the lia-
bilities of officers, directors, and external certifiers for misstatements in
periodic disclosures create new opportunities, the damages that these ac-
tions will generate are low compared with those associated with the elimi-
nated fraud-on-the-market suits.  Even if a higher fee percentage were
introduced, their total volume of fees is likely to be substantially lower.
The “defense bar,” while personally identifying with their corporate man-
agement clients’ frustration with fraud-on-the-market suits, may be suffi-
ciently self-interested not to advocate forcefully for the elimination of a
cause of action that derivatively generates so much business for them.  On
the other hand, these lawyers typically work for the same firms that could
benefit from the increase in due diligence work that the external certifi-
ers would undoubtedly send to them, as well as from increased work on
behalf of officers and directors seeking some kind of safe harbor from
liability.
It is unclear how the influence of these important organized groups,
pro and con, would come out in the balance.  The important point is that
the proposed reform is not just another good idea without a constituency.
Powerful groups would benefit from its adoption and, if properly edu-
cated about its potential benefits, might lead the fight.
B. Procedures
Under the proposed scheme, underwriters would be relieved of their
Securities Act section 11 liability.  Issuers and their officers and directors
would be relieved of their fraud-on-the-market Rule 10b-5 liability for mis-
statements in periodic disclosure filings.  Absolute liability, subject to a
due diligence defense, would be imposed on issuer officers and directors
and on external certifiers for misstatements in periodic disclosure filings.
The cleanest approach to implementation would be new legislation.
The problem with legislation is that the wide variety of persons who need
to cooperate to make it happen make it more vulnerable to a de facto
veto by organized interest groups in opposition.  The alternative to legis-
lation is administrative rulemaking by the SEC.  The SEC clearly has
broad powers of exemption from the impact of both statutory provisions
and its own rules under section 28A of the Securities Act, and its cognate
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section 36 of the Exchange Act.193  Under this authority, it could elimi-
nate underwriter section 11 liability and issuer, officer, and director
fraud-on-the-market liability for misstatements in periodic disclosure fil-
ings.  But finding a source of SEC authority to impose absolute liability
affirmatively, subject to a due diligence defense, on all issuer officers and
directors and on external certifiers is more difficult.
The SEC could, however, condition issuer receipt of the exemptions
contemplated by the scheme on the acceptance of the contemplated lia-
bilities by the issuer, its officers and directors, and its external certifier.
Thus participation in the grand bargain would be voluntary, firm by firm.
The SEC could make the program more attractive by appropriately rede-
ploying its staff so that the SEC level of review of the periodic filings of
participants is lower than it is now, and the level of review of the filings of
nonparticipants is higher than it is now.
There would be significant pressures on issuers to participate.  If they
were the target of a fraud-on-the-market suit, it would make their public
protests about the large expenses involved seem hollow, since they had a
transparency-enhancing way to obtain protection from such suits.  Also,
institutional investors, which have increasingly become corporate govern-
ance-oriented,194 could create substantial pressure for change.  Finally,
the managers that have the least to fear from greater transparency may
sign their issuers on as a way of differentiating themselves from other
issuers.  This combination of pressures should build the number of par-
ticipating issuers to a critical mass over time, where nonparticipation may
appear to be a deviation from best practices, and an embarrassment.  If
there are significantly fewer scandals among the participating group, it
may also lay the groundwork for legislation that might not have been
possible at the beginning.
CONCLUSION
The primary social benefits of disclosure by established issuers trad-
ing in efficient markets are the improved selection of proposed new in-
vestment projects in the economy and the improved operation of existing
ones, as well as the reduction in capital market illiquidity and other costs
of secondary market trading.  Disclosure is, in general, equally important
in terms of promoting these benefits whether an issuer is offering securi-
ties at the time or not.  This suggests that, unlike U.S. law today—where
the incentives are weaker when, as is the case most of the time, the issuer
193. Securities Act of 1933 § 28A, 15 U.S.C. § 77z(3) (“The Commission . . . may
conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class
or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this
subchapter . . . .”); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78mm (same).
194. See, e.g., Brian J. Bushee et al., Institutional Investor Preferences for Corporate
Governance Mechanisms 41 tbl.4 (Dec. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070168 (measuring firms’
preference for corporate governance from 1997 through 2004).
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is not currently offering any securities—the mandatory disclosure civil lia-
bility system should create an environment for corporate decisionmakers
where they have equally strong incentives to comply at all times.  Such an
approach would also eliminate the current system’s tendency to distort,
in ways unrelated to considerations of social benefit and social cost, issuer
management’s choices between internal and external finance and among
sources of external finance.  The proposal in this Article is an example of
a structure that meets these tests and helps us think through the larger
question of designing a system of civil liability that reflects a modern un-
derstanding of financial economics and the role of mandatory disclosure.
